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ood morning. The US naval base at Subic Bay was formally
" .G handed over to the Philippine government today.... Today is
Wednesday, September 30th, and this is NPR's 'Morning Edition.' "I
The American flag was lowered at Subic Bay Naval Station on No-
vember 24, 1992, with the last remaining forces withdrawing in De-
cember 1992, ending ninety-four years of American military presence
in the Philippines.2 In November 1991, the U.S. Air Force pulled out
of Clark Air Force Base, three months after it was buried in ashes,
rocks and mud from the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.3 The military with-
drawal from the Philippines resulted from the September 1991 rejec-
tion by the Philippine Senate, under the administration of President
Corazon Aquino, of a base treaty which would have renewed the mili-
tary bases agreement for another ten years, in exchange for more than
$2 billion in aid.4
The departure of the American military, however, left behind a sub-
stantial quantity of toxic waste.5 Proof of hazardous waste contamina-
tion left at the bases was recorded by the U.S. General Accounting
Office ("GAO") in a January 1992 report.6 In that report, the GAO
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Fordham University.
1. Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 30, 1992), available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File.
2. William Branigin, U.S. Military Ends Role in Philippines; After 94 Years, Navy
Leaves with Parade, Tears, Questions, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1992, at Al; International
Relationships, Political Risk Services, Dec. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Li-
brary, Phil File.
3. Branigin, supra note 2; Philippines: U.S. Leaves Toxic Legacy at Military Ba-
ses, Inter Press Service, Nov. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File
[hereinafter Toxic Legacy].4. Branigin, supra note 2; Subic Naval Base to Be Turned Over in Good Order:
U.S. Envoy, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Mar. 5, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
5. Ramon Isberto, Philippines: Toxic Waste Issue Heats up as US. Quits Bases,
Inter Press Service, Mar. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File;
Toxic Legacy, supra note 3 ("The United States will leave behind a frightening legacy
of environmental damage when it ends nearly a century of military presence in the
Philippines this week."). But see Branigin, supra note 2 (noting that these allegations
were brought up by critics of the U.S. presence, and that the U.S. Embassy disputed
the charges, claiming that the Navy had spent $5.5 million in recent months to remove
and transport the remaining hazardous wastes and leftover munitions to the United
States).
6. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-92-51 MILITARY BASE CLO-
SURES: U.S. FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES (1992) [hereinafter 1992
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found that untreated chemical and heavy metal wastes were dis-
charged into the air, the ground, and Subic Bay, from Subic Bay Naval
and Clark Air Force Bases.7 While the GAO had not ascertained the
full extent of the environmental damage caused by the military, it esti-
mated that the cleanup would cost approximately $12-15 million for
each site.8 In addition to the GAO report, an on-site investigation by
Filipino scientists and the Philippine Center for Investigative Journal-
ism ("PCIJ") reported that, for over forty years, the U.S. Navy and
Air Force had stored and improperly disposed of tons of military and
industrial wastes, including asbestos and polychlorinated biphenyls
("PCBs"), in and around Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Bases.9 Simi-
larly, a May 1993 report by the World Health Organization found po-
tential risk of pollution at Subic Bay. 10
United States Ambassador to the Philippines, Richard Solomon,
denied the various reports, contending that hazardous waste had been
transported back to the United States at a cost of $3 million.'1 Like-
wise, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Affairs,
James Lilley, assured President Aquino that there were no toxic waste
problems at the bases.'2 Significantly, although the military may have
provided for the transportation of hazardous chemicals back to the
United States, the military made no provision for the cleanup of toxic
wastes that had seeped into the soil and water.' 3 The GAO report
GAO REPORT]. The report was made in response to the request of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense. Id. at 1 (cover letter from
Assistant Comptroller General Frank C. Conahan to Senators Daniel K. Inouye and
Ted Stevens (Jan. 22, 1992)). The GAO, an independent legislative agency, audits
other government agencies and reports its findings to Congress to assist Congress's
oversight function. Joseph A. Wellington, A Primer on Environmental Law for the
Naval Services, 38 NAVAL L. REV. 5, 21 (1989).
7. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 27-28. See also Isberto, supra note 5
(citing the GAO report to confirm fears of" 'significant' " toxic waste pollution at the
bases). Subic Bay Naval Base is located approximately 60 miles from the country's
capital, Manila. Subic Bay Cleanup Study Sought, DEFENSE CLEANUP, Nov. 12, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
8. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 28.
9. Toxic Legacy, supra note 3.
10. See Subic Bay Cleanup Study Sought, supra note 7. For a more detailed discus-
sion of the WHO report, see infra text accompanying notes 59-61.
11. U.S. Denies Leaving Behind Polluted Bases, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov.
23, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. Prior to the departure of
the military, then-U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, Frank Wisner, assured report-
ers that there were no recorded health hazards resulting from environmental contami-
nation at Subic Bay Naval Base during American occupation. Wisner said that the
United States took pride in the way the Navy had protected the environment at Subic,
which includes thousands of acres of virgin forests, pristine watersheds and the bay.
Subic Naval Base to Be Turned Over in Good Order: U.S. Envoy, supra note 4.
12. Isberto, supra note 5.
13. See Michael Satchell, The Mess We've Left Behind, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 30, 1992, at 28 (reporting claims by Pentagon officials at the time of the with-
drawal that hazardous wastes were being removed by the military from Subic, but that
"there will be no cleanup of the badly contaminated soil and water" by the military).
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found that the basing agreement in effect at the time "[did] not im-
pose any well-defined environmental responsibility on the United
States for environmental cleanup and restoration."' 4 Furthermore,
while the official overseas policy of the U.S. Department of Defense
("DOD") calls for strict adherence to either U.S. or host-nation envi-
ronmental laws, whichever are more stringent, this policy is in reality
rarely followed.' 5 According to the GAO Report, if the United States
were to clean up these bases in compliance with U.S. standards, the
costs for the cleanup and restoration would near Superfund
proportions.' 6
This Note argues that the United States should be responsible for
remedying the environmental damage caused at its military bases
abroad, focusing particularly on the former U.S. military bases in the
Philippines. The Note asserts that the U.S. activities at those bases
failed to comply with environmental regulations and standards, and
therefore concludes that the United States should share responsibility
for cleaning up the ecological harm it caused. Part I provides a brief
history of relations between the United States and the Philippines
during the past century. This Part also examines environmental dam-
age and potential risks resulting from the U.S. military activities at
Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base. Part II discusses the
rights and responsibilities under the U.S.-Philippines military bases
agreements and amendments, and concludes that although no provi-
sions explicitly spell out the United States's environmental responsi-
bility, the agreements did not preempt any such obligations.
Part III thus examines the DOD's statutory environmental obliga-
tions under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"),' 7 as amended by the Federal Facility Compliance Act of
1992 ("FFCA").' 8 RCRA was enacted by Congress to effect a "cra-
14. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 27:
15. See Satchell, supra note 13.
16. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 27. The GAO considered prior estimates
reported by environmental officers at both bases for proposed environmental cleanup
projects that were never funded, and thus never undertaken. Projects proposed to
correct environmental hazards and remedy health threats at Subic Bay Navy Facility
were estimated to cost approximately $15 million, $12.7 million of which would pro-
vide a new sanitary waste water system, because the system then in place did not
comply with U.S. standards. Projects at Clark Air Base that were proposed prior to
the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, which included PCB removal, asbestos abatement, and
hazardous waste removal, were estimated at the time to cost $8.4 million. Id. at 28.
17. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter RCRA] (amending the Solid Waste Disposal Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
18. Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 note, 6903, 6908, 6924, 6927, 6939c, 6939c note, 6939d,
6939e, 6961, 6961 note, 6965 (Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter FFCA].
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die-to-grave" regulation of all solid and hazardous waste. 19 The
FFCA mandates federal agency compliance with RCRA and explicitly
waives sovereign immunity for all federal agencies with respect to sub-
stantive and procedural requirements of Section 6001 of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act.2" Since the FFCA subjects U.S. military bases to
compliance with RCRA, Part III suggests that RCRA, as amended by
the FFCA, similarly applies to military bases abroad.2' Arguably,
RCRA, as amended by the FFCA, did not apply to federal facilities
until the FFCA's enactment in October 1992. However, this Note
contends that the legislative intent in enacting RCRA, as reaffirmed
by the FFCA, had always required substantive and procedural federal
facility compliance.
Additionally, Part III examines the DOD's policies governing envi-
ronmental protection, cleanup and restoration of military bases, as
well as compliance with RCRA in overseas operations. In particular,
this section analyzes the inconsistency of DOD policy with regard to
environmental cleanup of its military bases abroad. The DOD re-
quested and received funding from Congress for overseas environ-
mental cleanup to comply with either host nation or U.S.
environmental laws, whichever are more stringent.22 Indeed, the
DOD has taken responsibility in the past for environmental compli-
ance, yet it has refused to do so in the Philippines.
Part IV then provides a brief discussion of pertinent international
law principles. Although international law may not bind the United
States, it provides significant policy reasons supporting the application
of U.S. laws to the bases in the Philippines. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that requiring overseas U.S. military installations to comply
with federal environmental laws is not only consistent with interna-
tional law, but is also mandated by statute, the DOD's policies and,
most importantly, by public policy.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Long Road to Independence
The Philippines was discovered in 1521 by Ferdinand Magellan, but
it was not until more than forty years later that Spanish colonists set-
19. Mr. Anders, Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Under RCRA: Evolving Contro-
versy, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1991, at 44, 44 (analyzing the application of RCRA regula-
tions to federal facilities).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by RCRA, supra note 17,
and the FFCA, supra note 18.
21. This Note focuses on RCRA and the FFCA. A discussion of possible obliga-
tions and liabilities by the United States for activities at overseas facilities under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988
& Supp. V 1993), and possible cleanup obligations under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), is beyond the scope of this Note.
22. See discussion infra part III.C.
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tied there with the aim of converting the Malay natives to Catholi-
cism.23 In 1896, a Filipino rebellion broke out and continued until
1898, when the United States, having declared war on Spain, inter-
vened. As a result of the United States's success in the Spanish-
American War, Spain, which had reigned over the Philippines for al-
most four centuries, surrendered the country in 1898.24 The Ameri-
cans helped return Emilio Aguinaldo, exiled leader of the Filipino
rebellion, who then proclaimed Philippine independence on June 12,
1898. However, the Filipinos soon realized that, in reality, their coun-
try had been ceded by Spain, not to them, but to the United States. 25
Having lost hope of a grant of independence from the United States,
the Filipinos resisted the American forces in 1899. The Filipino-
American War lasted until 1902, ending with the capture of President
Aguinaldo, who then swore allegiance to the United States.26 The
Philippines became a self-governing commonwealth in 1934, with full
independence scheduled for 1946.27 However, the road to indepen-
dence was interrupted when Japan invaded the Philippines in Decem-
ber 1941.28 The Hukbalahap, a guerilla group that had sought land
reforms since the 1930s, resisted the Japanese, 29 and paved the way for
U.S. forces to reoccupy the islands and battle the Japanese until World
War II ended in 1945.30 The Philippines finally gained independence
on July 4, 1946.31
23. See Political Background: Historical Background, COUNTRY PROFILE (Bus.
Int'l), July 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Phil File [hereinafter Histori-
cal Background]. Magellan was later killed by Lapu-Lapu, the Philippines's first na-
tional hero, a native who resisted Spanish colonial settlement. Catholicism has been
the prevalent religion in the Philippines.
24. See id.; Political Background, COUNTRY PROFILE (Bus. Int'l), July 1, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Phil File [hereinafter Political Background].
25. See Historical Background, supra note 23 (attributing the surrender of the
Philippines to the Americans to the "collusion between the U.S. armed forces and the
Spanish colonial authorities").
26. See id.; Political Background, supra note 24 (stating that the Filipino-American
War "ended with the imposition of US rule").
27. See Historical Background, supra note 23. During that period, U.S. colonial
rule introduced democratic institutions and English-language education throughout
the country, but made little change to the social and economic structure, which fa-
vored the mestizo elite (descendants of Spanish settlers) and the highly exploitive
system of land tenancy in the countryside, as introduced by the Spanish colonial rule.
Id.
28. Id.
29. During that time, the elite remained in power by cooperating with the Japa-
nese. Historical Background, supra note 23.
30. In the meantime, the Philippines was declared an independent republic within
the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1943. Id.
31. See id. Today, the Philippines celebrates Independence Day on June 12th, the
day that President Aguinaldo first proclaimed independence from Spain in 1898.
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B. U.S. -Philippines Relations
Since 1946, the United States and the Philippines have generally
enjoyed close and auspicious relations.32 Under a trade agreement,
the Philippines was given preferential economic status by the United
States that allowed duty-free entry of Philippine goods until 1954.33
In return, U.S. citizens were conferred parity with Filipinos in the ex-
ploitation of the Philippines's natural resources until 1954.34 These
rights were extended by agreement-to 1955,35 and then extended again
until 1974.36 Importantly, in 1947, the two nations entered into an
agreement granting the United States the right to use twenty-three
military bases in the Philippines, including Clark Air Force Base and
Subic Bay Naval Base, for ninety-nine years.37 In return for the use of
the military bases, the Philippines received millions of dollars in aid, in
addition to military security. The strength and nature of the U.S. pres-
ence in the Philippines led to increasing hostility by a growing number
of Filipinos, who believed that the alliance of the two countries per-
petuated colonialism and hindered complete Philippine sovereignty.38
In 1966, the two countries agreed to shorten the term of the 1947
Agreement, originally ninety-nine years from 1947, to twenty-five
32. Auspicious relations between the two countries actually date back to the U.S.
suzerainty, when there existed free trade between them, preferential treatment for
Philippine agricultural exports, and growing U.S. investment in the Philippines. Polit-
ical Background, supra note 24.
33. Agreement Concerning Trade and Related Matters During a Transitional Pe-
riod Following Philippine Independence, July 4, 1946, amended on Oct. 22, 1946,
U.S.-Phil., 61 Stat. 2611 (entered into force Jan. 2, 1947).
34. Id. at 2618; see also Historical Background, supra note 23.
35. Extension of Duty-Free Period From July 4, 1954, Through Dec. 31, 1955, July
7, 1954, U.S.-Phil., 5 U.S.T. 1629.
36. Agreement to Extend Duty-Free Period, Sept. 6, 1955, U.S.-Phil., 6*U.S.T.
2981. The two nations also agreed that:
the Philippine Government will hold the United States harmless for any
claims for personal injury or death or damage to property which are attribu-
table to any activities in connection with the exploitation of natural re-
sources within the base area, with the exception of those meritorious claims
paid by the United States in accordance with its claims legislation arising out
of activities of any official, employee, or agent of the United States.
Military Bases in the Philippines: Exploitation of Natural Resources, Apr. 8, 1957,
U.S.-Phil., 9 U.S.T. 309, 311.
37. Agreement Concerning Military Bases, Mar. 14, 1947, U.S.-Phil., 61 Stat. 4019,
4031-32 [hereinafter 1947 Military Bases Agreement or 1947 Agreement].
38. See generally Peter Stephens, Philippines: US Loses Subic Bay Military Base
in Close Senate Vote, THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 21, 1991, at 14, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Phil File. Stephens recalled that the Filipino liberation from Japan in
1945 was a result of the U.S. military intervention, as memorialized by the fulfillment
of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur's promise when he left Bataan to set up a tem-
porary base in Australia: " 'I came through and I shall return.' " On the other hand,
Stephens stated that liberation in 1991 for the Filipinos meant something else: libera-
tion from the long-standing link with the U.S. military. Id.
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years from 1966.19 When the agreement .approached expiration in
1991, the U.S. and Philippine governments engaged in negotiations for
more than a year to determine how long to extend the agreement. 40
The two countries finally agreed, inter alia,4 ' to extend U.S. presence
at Subic Bay Naval Base for ten years in exchange for at least $203
million in annual aid to the Philippines for each year the United States
remained.42 The United States agreed to relinquish Clark Air Force
Base, which was heavily damaged by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, to
the Philippine military by September 1992.43 . The U.S.-Philippine
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security was signed by both
countries on August 27, 1991,"4 subject to ratification by the Philip-
pine Senate as required by the Philippine Constitution.45
On September 16, 1991, the day the existing lease was scheduled to
expire, the Philippine Senate rejected the U.S.-Philippine Treaty of
39. Agreement Amending the Agreement of Mar. 14, 1947, as Amended, Sept. 16,
1966, U.S.-Phil., 17 U.S.T. 1212 [hereinafter Ramos-Rusk Exchange of Notes]. The
agreement was thus set to expire by 1991, unless terminated by agreement at an ear-
lier date. Id.
40. Michael Bociurkiw, Philippines: Manila and US Forge New Military Bases
Agreement, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 18, 1991, at 9, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Phil File [hereinafter Bociurkiw I].
41. The United States also contemplated other terms, including free or discounted
provision of surplus U.S. military equipment to the Philippines, a procurement pro-
gram to promote the purchase of Philippine-made goods by U.S. forces in the Pacific,
and U.S. assistance in establishing a fund for the rehabilitation of areas damaged by
the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Id.; see US-Philippine Joint Statement, DEP'T ST. Dis-
PATCH, July 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Dstate File (highlighting the
terms of the proposed agreement).
42. See Bociurkiw I, supra note 40. The treaty was forged by U.S. Special Negoti-
ator, Richard Armitage, and Philippine Foreign Secretary, Raul Manglapus, in July
1991. It was agreed that for 1992, the Philippines would receive $550 million, and that
after the ninth year of the lease, a bilateral committee would arrange for an orderly
American withdrawal when the lease expired, unless the Philippines requested an ex-
tension. Id.
43. Id. During negotiations before the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, the Philippine
government had sought a seven-year lease in return for $825 million annual compen-
sation, while the American government had sought a ten-year lease for $360 million
annual compensation. Id. The final terms reflected the loss of the Philippines's bar-
gaining power as a result of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Bociurkiw reports that U.S.
panel spokesperson, Stanley Schrager, stated that extensive studies of the damaged
Clark Air Base led the American government to conclude that rehabilitation was too
costly and that the facility had been rendered inoperable. Id. Another report, how-
ever, states that the Philippines, valuing the agreement at $773 million, claimed a
victory over the agreed treaty. Executive Watchlist, Bus. ASIA (Bus. Int'l), July 22,
1991, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Phil File.
44. Update on the Philippines: Kenneth M. Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Sept. 30, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Dstate File [hereinafter Quinn Statement].
45. See Bociurkiw I, supra note 40; Executive Watchlist, supra note 43. In contrast,
the United States had planned to bring the treaty into legal force by way of an execu-
tive- agreement with due notice to Congress. US-Philippine Treaty, DEP'T ST. Dis-
PATCH, Sept. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Dstate File (statement by
the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman on Aug. 27, 1991).
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Friendship, Cooperation and Security by a narrow vote of twelve to
eleven.46 The Philippine Senate's decision amounted to a termination
notice of the 1947 Agreement.47 To delay the eviction of the Ameri-
can forces, President Aquino rescinded the termination notice for
Subic Bay Naval Base, enabling the U.S. forces to remain at the base
until one year after service of a new notice of termination of the 1947
Military Base Agreement.48 President Aquino planned to hold a na-
tional referendum that would have allowed the Filipino people to vote
to override the Senate decision.4 9 However, faced with political pres-
sure just half a year before the next election, President Aquino with-
drew her proposal for a national referendum, and instead decided on
an executive agreement calling for a three-year phased withdrawal by
the U.S. military.5"
This executive agreement, which required ratification by two-thirds
of the Philippine Senate, met strong opposition from the "anti-bases"
bloc of senators.51 In challenging Aquino's compromise, the opposi-
tion claimed that she violated the Philippine Constitution, which pro-
hibited foreign troops from occupying Philippine soil absent a treaty
ratified by a two-thirds Senate majority.52 Finally, in December 1991,
46. Quinn Statement, supra note 44. A two-thirds vote of the Philippine Senate,
amounting to 16 of the 23 Philippine Senators, was required by the Philippine Consti-
tution to ratify the treaty. Id.
47. See Stephens, supra note 38.
48. Id. Despite President Aquino's attempts to, in effect, overrule the Philippine
Senate's rejection of the treaty and to promote a renegotiation for a new lease, the
United States, which had already been cutting its forces in the Pacific, indicated that it
would abide by the decision of the Philippine Senate and respect the Philippine con-
stitutional process. See generally id. (quoting Senators Simon and Lugar, both mem-
bers of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
49. See id.; Manny Benitez, Philippines: Secret Surveys Made Aquino Change Her
Stance, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 4, 1991, at 23, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Phil File. Many believed that the Senate's decision was costly, resulting in
the loss of aid by way of defense security and hundreds of millions of dollars, as well
as the loss of the Philippines's second-largest employer, the U.S. military. Stephens,
supra note 38. Forty thousand Filipino workers were employed at Subic Bay Naval
Base. Michael Bociurkiw, Philippines: Air Bases Deal Cannot Prolong Aquino Fare-
well, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Oct. 6, 1991, at 7, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Phil File [hereinafter Bociurkiw II].
50. See Benitez, supra note 49. Benitez attributed three secret public opinion
surveys to the change in President Aquino's mind. These surveys revealed a negative
response to a plebiscite that would override the Senate decision. A prior survey con-
ducted in 1987 by the Social Weather Station of the Ateneo University of Manila had
indicated that at least 60% of Filipinos were in favor of the continued presence of the
American military at the bases. Id. Due to the change in public opinion, the national
referendum proposal was considered "farfetched" and unpopular. President
Aquino's decision to allow the U.S. military to remain rent-free during the three-year
withdrawal period, in exchange for "'any and all assistance' " from the United States
toward the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, was
considered an eleventh-hour compromise to revive her political reputation. Boci-
urkiw II, supra note 49.
51. Bociurkiw II, supra note 49.
52. Id.
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due to disagreements on the conditions of the pullout, the Philippine
government served the United States a one-year notice to withdraw
completely by the end of 1992.53
C. Environmental Damage Caused by U.S. Military Activities
at the Bases
As the U.S. military systematically withdrew from its bases in the
Philippines, controversy regarding, and investigations of, serious toxic
waste problems at and around the bases surfaced and grew. 4 The
toxic waste issue was first raised in 1990, in a study conducted by Jorge
Emmanuel, a U.S.-based environmental analyst.55 Although the study
was not conducted at Subic or Clark, it was based on the activities at
other military installations in the United States, activities which were
similar to those undertaken at Subic and Clark. Emmanuel concluded
that activities at Subic and Clark "were probably producing a noxious
brew of acids, ammunition wastes, organic solvents, chemical warfare
agents, industrial sludge, pesticides, waste oils, radioactive wastes and
polychlorinated biphenyl[s] (PCBs). '56
Subsequently, the Emmanuel study was confirmed by the 1992 U.S.
GAO report, which characterized the environmental damage to the
Subic Bay Naval Base as "significant," and found that the U.S. prac-
tice at the bases "would not be in compliance with U.S. environmental
standards," and "pose[s] serious health and safety threats."57 Specifi-
cally, the GAO reported that the Subic Bay Facility had no complete
sanitary sewer system or treatment facility, causing sewage and pro-
cess waste waters to be discharged directly into Subic Bay. Only
twenty-five percent of the five million gallons of sewage generated
daily was treated. Furthermore, the report indicated that lead and
53. International Relations and Defence, COUNTRY PROFILE (Bus. Int'l), July 1,
1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Phil File.
54. See, e.g., Subic Naval Base to Be Turned Over in Good Order: U.S. Envoy,
supra note 4 (reporting allegations that nuclear material and waste existed at Subic
Bay Base and that lead and heavy metal either drained into the Bay or were buried in
landfill); Isberto, supra note 5 (citing concerns expressed by Green Forum, one of the
Philippines's largest environmental umbrella organizations, and the results of the 1992
GAO report and a 1990 study by Jorge Emmanuel, a U.S.-based environmental ana-
lyst); Toxic Legacy, supra note 3 (quoting former Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, now
deputy director of the Center for Defense Information: " '[w]e were endlessly pro-
ducing industrial toxic chemicals and discarding them without due regard for the
pollution' ").
55. Toxic Legacy, supra note 3. Dr. Emmanuel, a Philippine-born environmentai
scientist, is president of Environmental Engineering Research Group, a California
consulting firm. Teresa Albor, As U.S. Vacates Philippines Bases, Toxic Wastes Re-
main, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 29, 1992, at A-46 [hereinafter Albor I].
56. Isberto, supra note 5. The Emmanuel study prompted the Philippine Senate to
recommend to the Philippine government that it provide for an environmental pro-
gram in the proposed new treaty. This entire treaty, however, was subsequently re-
jected by the Philippine Senate. Id.
57. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 3, 27, 28.
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other heavy metals from the ship repair facility's sandblasting site
either drained directly into the bay or were buried in the landfill. The
GAO declared that neither of these procedures complied with U.S.
standards, which require that lead and heavy metals be handled and
disposed of as hazardous waste. The report also indicated *that the
power plant at Subic Bay contained unknown amounts of PCBs and
emitted untreated pollutants directly into the air. Although the con-
tent of the emissions had not been tested, officials told the GAO that
the emissions would not meet U.S. clean air standards.5 8
In addition, a World Health Organization ("WHO") investigation
of Subic Bay Naval Base, based on visual inspection and data on past
Navy activities, found no visual or flagrant pollution, but identified
areas within Subic where there were potential risks of pollution.59
The May 1993 report suggested potential risks in the following areas:
the Ship Repair Facility, in which pesticides, herbicides, PCBs, chlo-
rinated solvents, and explosives were used or stored; landfills located
near groundwater supplies that were suspected of containing hydro-
carbons, radioactive wastes, pesticides, asbestos, and heavy metals;
fuel storage and distribution facilities at the electrical power generat-
ing plant that posed a risk to the groundwater supply by potential re-
lease of diesel fuel and oil; and several aboveground and thirty-year-
old corroded underground tanks and pump stations that had allowed
leakage of jet fuel, diesel petrol oils, tank sludges, and heavy metals.6"
According to the WHO report, base records indicated that industrial
waste waters, untreated sewage, and polluted storm water runoff were
discharged into Subic Bay, mostly without treatment. Therefore,
WHO suspected that these effluents had settled on the seabed, and
may have adversely affected coral reefs and other marine life.6
58. Id. at 27-28 (Navy officials pointed out the hazards to the GAO.). In a sepa-
rate 1991 report on hazardous waste management in overseas U.S. military installa-
tions, the GAO reported:
Department of Defense (DOD) bases in their normal operations generate
hazardous waste such as solvents, paints, contaminated sludges, contami-
nated fuel and oil, and phenols (poisonous acidic compounds). These wastes
are generated by motorpools, paint shops, fire departments, hospitals, medi-
cal clinics, and laundries. Hazardous waste is usually generated as a by-
product of activities 'such as cleaning, degreasing, stripping, painting, or
metal plating. Hazardous waste, if improperly controlled or disposed of, can
endanger humans and the environment by polluting ground and surface wa-
ters, contaminating soil, and jeopardizing air quality. Hazardous waste can
be solids, liquids, sludges, or contained gases and may be ignitable, corro-
sive, reactive, and/or toxic.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-91-231, HAZARDOUS WASTE: MAN-
AGEMENT PROBLEMS CONTINUE AT. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES 8 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter 1991 GAO REPORT] (emphasis added).




An on-site investigation by Filipino scientists and the Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism revealed that the Navy and Air
Force in fact stored and improperly disposed of tons of military and
industrial wastes, and stored and used hazardous materials such as as-
bestos and PCBs.6 2 The investigation also revealed that the eleven-
mile pipeline linking Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Bases contained
large volumes of highly corrosive aviation fuel, and that live bombs
and ammunition were left at firing ranges at both bases.63 A former
Filipino worker at Subic Bay's Ship Repair Facility stated that he and
other workers were not warned until just before the closing of the
base about the risks of inhaling asbestos and other toxic wastes while
repairing and cleaning Navy ships.64 Another former worker indi-
cated that ground soiled by PCB-contaminated fuel was excavated
and isolated by workers wearing protective clothing and respirators,
but that this procedure was only implemented during the last year of
U.S. presence at Subic Bay. 65 A former Filipino worker at the dump
at Subic Bay claimed that he had observed the American military bury
leaking barrels of cyanide.' There are also reports that unexploded
bombs and ammunition left at firing ranges had exploded, killing and
wounding children.67
Moreover, Philippine Representative Ferdinand Marcos II claimed
that the U.S. military improperly stored PCBs and other toxic and
hazardous wastes, abandoned thousands of gallons of unused aviation
fuel in the underground pipeline connecting Clark Air Force Base
with Subic Bay Naval Base, and left behind thousands of unexploded
bombs and live ammunition at firing ranges at both bases.68 However,
three teams, including a team from the Philippine Environment and
Natural Resources Department and a Philippine congressional delega-
tion team, conducted two visual investigations of the bases and found
no evidence of toxic waste.69 The teams did find aviation fuel leakage
62. See Toxic Legacy, supra note 3. The U.S. Embassy in Manila denied these
charges, and claimed that these studies were "'reporting hearsay evidence.' " Id.




66. See Larry LaMotte, Military Mess Part 4: Third World Peoples Suffer (CNN
Specials television broadcast, Nov. 7, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File [hereinafter CNN Special].
67. See Toxic Legacy, supra note 3.
68. Subic Bay Cleanup Study Sought, supra note 7.
69. Id. The Deputy Administrator of Subic Bay's Metropolitan Authority, Inky
Reyes, similarly claimed that no toxic wastes were found upon inspection of the site,
stating, " 'I doubt very much if the'Americans would have dumped toxic waste in an
area where they had their wives, and children going to schools. Why bury toxic waste
in the area?' " Id. To the contrary, the 1992 GAO report found, for example, that
only 25% of the five million gallons of daily sewage discharged directly into Subic Bay
was treated, that lead and other heavy metal drained directly into Subic Bay or were
buried in the landfill; and that the facility's power plant, which contained PCBs, emit-
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into the groundwater supply from some underground storage tanks.7°
In 1993, Filipino scientists, at the direction of Dr. Roger Dawson at
the University of Maryland, analyzed samples of soil, water and air
from Clark Air Force Base and detected traces of PCBs, PAHs, heavy
metals, and high concentrations of a pesticide.7'
The potential health risks of soil and groundwater contamination
include disturbance of the central nervous system, high blood pres-
sure, and, in extreme cases, retardation of development in newborns. 72
PCBs, which are used in transformers, cause cancer, and may cause
severe skin diseases.73 According to one source, empty toxic waste
barrels were taken from Subic after the U.S. withdrawal and sold at
small shops outside the base. The barrels were used by poor villagers,
unaware of the health hazards, to store water for washing and
drinking.74
Not surprisingly, American officials disputed the various findings.75
Asserting that the military base agreements between the two nations
made no provision for compliance with any environmental standards
or for the cleanup of the bases, the DOD denied any responsibility.
However, as discussed below, while the agreements may not have ex-
plicitly and clearly addressed each country's environmental responsi-
bilities regarding the bases, neither did they absolve the United States
of any of its then-existing, independent obligations, including the
DOD's duty to comply with its own environmental policies and
RCRA. Given the nature and the closeness of the U.S. relationship
with the Philippines, there is a heightened expectation that the United
States would justly acknowledge its environmental responsibilities for
damage done at the bases.
Prior to the U.S. pullout from Subic Bay Naval Base in 1992, the
American Ambassador, Frank Wisner, gave assurance that the base
would be returned in good order. He expressly promised: "[i]t is im-
portant that we do so, we stand by our commitment as a government
ted untreated pollutants directly into the air. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 27-
28. Furthermore, the military's toxic legacy is not just a foreign one; such problems
are also prevalent at military bases located within U.S. boundaries. See generally Kyle
Bettigole, Comment, Defending Against Defense: Civil Resistance, Necessity and the
United States Military's Toxic Legacy, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 667 (1994).
70. Subic Bay Cleanup Study Sought, supra note 7.
71. See CNN Special, supra note 66.
72. Id.; Isberto, supra note 5.
73. See Toxic Legacy, supra note 3; Teresa Albor, US Hands Back Toxic Cocktail,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina
File [hereinafter Albor II].
74. CNN Special, supra note 66.
75. The U.S. Embassy in the Philippines stated that the Navy had spent $5.5 mil-
lion to remove and transport the remaining hazardous wastes and leftover munitions
to the United States. Branigin, supra note 2. On the other hand, a former Filipino
worker at Subic doubted that the Americans would have undertaken the dangerous
operation of digging up the barrels of cyanide he says he saw the military bury. CNN
Special, supra note 66 (statement by Rolando Lagadon).
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to a safe environment and we place great stock in our cooperation
with the Philippines in the field of efivironmental protection."76 De-
spite this purported commitment, a legacy of toxic wastes was left in
and around the bases.77 A DOD spokesperson contended that the
U.S. facility's disposal of hazardous wastes at the Philippine bases
complied with DOD standards.7" The spokesperson added that the
practices at the bases "exceed[ed] local environmental standards."7 9
In response, Louis Zanardi of the GAO replied: "in a less devel-
oped country, which doesn't have the wherewithal to protect the envi-
ronment, you basically have a license to pollute .... To say that the
host country doesn't [control pollution] should not let us off the
hook."8 0 Moreover, Mr. Zanardi claimed that U.S. bases in developed
countries, particularly in Germany, followed stricter environmental
practices because those countries paid residual value for the bases
when they were turned over.81 There were no such incentives for the
United States in connection with the bases in the Philippines because
the agreement in effect at the time of the U.S. withdrawal provided
that the Philippines would pay no compensation for non-removable
structures when the bases were turned over. 2 Furthermore, while the
United States will pay some of the cleanup costs of installations in
Europe as agreed upon through the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, the DOD pays less attention to cleanup costs in developing coun-
tries such as Korea, the Philippines, and Turkey.83 Thus, it is even
more unfair that the DOD has been following its policy arbitrarily.
Characterized more appropriately, the DOD has applied its policy
more favorably to developed nations, and undeniably less favorably to
developing nations-the very nations which are less capable of de-
tecting, preventing, and remediating harm to their environments and
are clearly dependent upon assistance from, and involvement with de-
veloped nations. The reality that environmental laws of the host
country are not enforced does not excuse the United States from ad-
hering to either the host country laws or the U.S. laws, whichever are
stricter, as called for by DOD policy.' In fact, the GAO reported that
76. Subic Naval Base to be Turned Over in Good Order: U.S. Envoy, supra note 4.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 54-74.
78. See Ben Barber, Philippines: Yankees Go Home, but Their Memory Lingers,
SUNDAY AGE (Melbourne), Mar. 29, 1992, at 12 available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Phil File (quoting a U.S. Defense spokesperson: "US facility disposal of hazardous
wastes is done in compliance with Department of Defence standards. Hazardous




81. Id.; see also Albor I, supra note 55.
82. See infra note 104.
83. Satchell, supra note 13.
84. The GAO stated in its 1991 report to Congress:
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the problems of compliance at the overseas bases "may be jeopardiz-
ing political and defense relationships. '"85
II. ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE MILITARY
BASE AGREEMENTS
Although the military base agreements "[did] not impose any well-
defined environmental responsibility on the United States for envi-
ronmental cleanup and restoration,"86 the agreements did not exoner-
ate the United States from such responsibilities either. Rather, the
agreements only provided the particular instances in which the United
States was not obligated to make repairs, or restore the occupied sites.
Such provisions' also did not preclude any other obligations of the
United States. The following section provides an historical back-
ground of the military base agreements, with an emphasis on the sub-
stantial control given to the United States over the bases. With this
control and with the benefits derived from the use of the bases, come
corresponding responsibilities, including a responsibility to comply
with environmental standards.
A. Military Bases Agreement of 1947
The United States and the Philippines entered into the Military Ba-
ses Agreement in 1947 in recognition of a mutual interest in the de-
fense of their respective territories, and the United States's interest in
providing for the defense of the Philippines and in developing an ef-
fective Philippine -armed forces.87 In Article I, the Philippine govern-
ment granted the United States government the right to retain the use
of certain bases in the Philippines.8" The 1947 Agreement lease was
to remain in force for ninety-nine years, subject to any agreed exten-
sions.8 9 As evidenced by the language within its various articles, the
1947 Agreement clearly gave the United States control over the bases
for the duration of the lease.
[W]e do not agree that enforcing U.S. laws and regulations on the parts of
the base where U.S. operations, such as the maintenance of U.S. aircraft, are
taking place would cause political or diplomatic problems. We agree that
problems would result if DOD tried to enforce U.S. laws on host country
operations on other parts of the base. We believe it is essential that U.S.
regulations be used in places where U.S. operations take place in order to
protect U.S. personnel. Not protecting U.S. personnel and the environment
just because a host country does not enforce its environmental laws does not
appear to be prudent.
1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 58, at 25-26 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 45.
86. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 27.
87. 1947 Military Bases Agreement, supra note 37, at 4019.
88. Id. art. I, at 4020.
89. Id. art. XXIX, at 4031. In 1966, the countries agreed to reduce the term of the
agreement from 99 years to 25 years, thereby advancing the expiration to September
16, 1991. Ramos-Rusk Exchange of Notes, supra note 39.
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Arguably, the 1947 Agreement contemplated that environmental
responsibilities would accompany this control over the bases since Ar-
ticle III granted the United States "the rights, power and authority
within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use, opera-
tion and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof."'
Even more specifically, Article VIII allowed the United States "to
take such steps as may be mutually agreed upon to be necessary to
improve health and sanitation in areas contiguous to the bases," and
provided that the United States pay just compensation for any per-
sonal injuries or property damage resulting from any action taken pur-
suant to Article VIII.91 Clearly, the 1947 Agreement contemplated
that the United States would help improve health and sanitation
around the bases, even providing redress should the United States act
improperly. More importantly, Article XXIII exposed the United
States to civil liability for claims "on account of damage to or loss or
destruction of private property, both real and personal, or personal
injury or death of inhabitants of the Philippines, when such damage,
loss, destruction or injury is caused by the armed forces of the United
States."9 Thus, it is evident that under the agreement the United
States controlled bases to which certain legal and environmental re-
sponsibilities attached.
While the 1947 Agreement contained a "no repair clause" in Article
XVII which explicitly stated that the United States was not obligated
to return the bases to the condition they were in at the time of occupa-
tion,93 the clause referred only to buildings and structures and did not
give the United States carte blanche to return the land contaminated
with toxic wastes. Additionally, Article XVII granted the United
States ownership and control of buildings and structures it erected at
the bases, and freed the United States and the Philippines from any
obligation to repair any damage to the structures.94 Yet, nothing in
90. 1947 Military Bases Agreement, supra note 37, art. III, para. 1, at 4021.
91. Id. art. VIII, at 4023 (emphasis added).
92. Id. art. XXIII, at 4029-30. The statute of limitations for such claims was one
year "after the occurrence of the accident or incident out of which such claim[s]
arose." Id. at 4030.
93. Id. art. XVII, para. 2, at 4027.
94. Id. Article XVII, paragraph 2 of the 1947 Agreement states:
All buildings and structures which are erected by the United States in the
bases shall be the property of the United States and may be removed by it
before the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of the
base on which the structures are situated. There shall be no obligation on the
part of the United States or of the Philippines to rebuild or repair any destruc-
tion or damage inflicted from any cause whatsoever on any of the said build-
ings or structures owned or used by the United States in the bases. The United
States is not obligated to turn over the bases to the Philippines at the expiration
of this Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of any bases in the condition
in which they were at the time of their occupation, nor is the Philippines
obliged to make any compensation to the United States for the improve-
ments made in the bases or for the buildings or structures left thereon, all of
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that Article excused the United States from any obligation to repair
damage to the land and the environment.
B. 1979 Amendment
In 1979, the 1947 Military Bases Agreement was substantially
amended to reflect Philippine sovereignty over the U.S. lease of Phil-
ippine military bases.95 The amendment by Exchange of Notes ("1979
Amendment") clarified that the military bases covered by the agree-
ment were Philippine military bases under the command of Philippine
Base Commanders.96 Nevertheless, U.S. Commanders were given
command and control over the facility, U.S. military personnel, civil-
ian personnel employed by the military, U.S. equipment and material,
and any military operations involving U.S. forces.97 The agreement
directed both the Philippine Base Commanders and the U.S. Com-
manders to perform their duties with full respect for Philippine sover-
eignty, while assuring unhampered U.S. military operations. 98 It
further required that both countries' base commanders cooperate, and
coordinate, in matters affecting U.S. facilities at the bases.99 And,
although the Philippine Base Commander served as the first point of
contact concerning the administration, security, operations and con-
trol of the bases, the U.S. Commander served as the initial point of
contact on matters relating to, among other things, the U.S. facilities,
U.S. equipment and material."° The countries also agreed to conduct
a thorough review and reassessment of the agreement every five years
to assure that the agreement continued to serve the mutual interests
of both countries. 1°1 Thus, while the Philippines won sovereignty over
the bases under the 1979 Amendment, the United States retained and
exercised considerable control over the facilities.
which shall become the property of the Philippines upon the termination of
the Agreement or the earlier relinquishment by the United States of the ba-
ses where the structures have been built.
Id. (emphasis added).
95. Agreement Amending the Agreement of Mar. 14, 1947, as Amended, Jan. 7,
1979, U.S.-Phil., 30 U.S.T. 863 [hereinafter 1979 Amendment]. The 1947 Agreement
was amended 14 times prior to 1979. However, these changes are irrelevant to this
Note's discussion. On the other hand, the 1979 Amendment was a substantial change
to the original agreement, reflecting the shift of sovereignty of the bases to the Philip-
pines. For this reason, this Note only addresses the original agreement, the 1979
amendment, the 1988 amendment (which embodied the latest agreement in force up
to the time of the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines), and the 1992 proposed
agreement (which never went into force).
96. Id. annex III, para. 1, at 879.
97. Id. para. 2.
98. Id. para. 3.
99. Id. para. 4.
100. Id. para. 7, at 880.
101. Id. at 864.
1994] OVERSEAS BASE CONTAMINATION 127
C. 1988 Amendment
A 1988 review of the military bases agreement made pursuant to
the 1979 Amendment produced an agreement ("1988 Amend-
ment"),1 0 2 which, among other things, amended Article XVII of the
1947 Military Bases Agreement to address ownership of, and respon-
sibilities for, non-removable buildings and structures on the bases.1 3
Article VII of the 1988 Amendment (amending Article XVII of the
1947 Agreement) addressed Philippine possession of, and sovereignty
over, the bases, but limited it merely to non-removable structures,
which nonetheless remained under U.S. possession and control during
U.S. occupation.10 4 Article VII specifically stated that the "right of
use of [non-removable buildings or structures on the bases] shall re-
vert to the Philippines upon the termination of this Agreement,', 10 5
whereas originally, the 1947 Agreement simply stated that "all [build-
102. Military Bases Agreement Review, Oct. 17, 1988, U.S.-PhiI., DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Dec. 1988, at 24 [hereinafter 1988 Amendment].
103. Id. art. VII, para. 2, at 25. "Non-removable buildings and structures" were
defined as:
buildings, structures, and other improvements permanently affixed to the
ground, and such equipment that is essential to the habitability and general
use of such improvements and is permanently attached to or integrated into
the property [including] roads, runways, buildings with basements, perma-
nently installed plumbing, heating, and cooling systems required for normal
habitation purposes, and generators for basic electric power requirements of
such buildings.
Id. Agreed Minute, at 26 [hereinafter Minute I]. In contrast, "removable property"
was defined as:
demountable structures . . ., communications equipment, navigational aids,
vehicles, furniture, portable air conditioners, aircraft, weapons, ammunition,
office equipment, data processing equipment, special heating and cooling
equipment not related to habitability of a structure, generators for special
power requirements exceeding habitability and general use requirements,
and other types of military or special use equipment.
Id. "Removable property" was considered property of the United States. Id. art. VII,
para. 1, at 25.
104. 1988 Amendment, supra note 102, art. VII, para. 2, at 25. Paragraph 2 states,
in pertinent part:
Non-removable buildings and structures within the bases, including essen-
tial utility systems such as energy and water production and distribution sys-
tems and heating and air conditioning systems that are an integral part of
such buildings and structures, are the property of the Government of the
Philippines, and shall be so registered. The United States shall, however,
have the right of full use, in accordance with this Agreement, of such non-
removable buildings and structures within the United States Facilities at the
bases, including the right to repair, alter or, when necessary for reasons of
safety or new construction, to demolish them.
Id. (emphasis added). Compare this language with the original text of Article XVII,
paragraph 2 of the 1947 Agreement, supra note 37 (referring only to "buildings and
structures") as opposed to the 1988 Amendment language, which distinguished be-
tween "removable property" and "non-removable buildings and structures," the latter
of which was designated as Philippine property. 1988 Amendment, supra note 102,
art. VII, para. 2, at 25.
105. 1988 Amendment, supra note 102, art. VII, para. 2, at 25.
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ings or structures] shall become the zproperty of the Philippines upon
the termination of the Agreement."'" Therefore, Philippine owner-
ship was limited to such non-removable structures and equipment,
which were to revert to the Philippines only upon termination of the
agreement. Prior to that time and during U.S. use and occupation,
these non-removable structures remained under the control and pos-
session of the United States.
Furthermore, although Article VII contained a "no repair"
clause, 107 it referred only to repair of damage inflicted on any of the
non-removable buildings or structures'used by the United States ° 8-
not to damage to the air, water and land. In addition, although Arti-
cle VII retained the clause that exonerated the United States from
turning over the bases in the condition they were in at the time of
occupation, 0 9 the 1988 Amendment did not preclude the United
States from rehabilitating the damaged land and environment.
The 1988 Amendment also added a third paragraph to Article XVII
of the 1947 Agreement, directing the United States and the Philip-
pines "to ensure a smooth transition" upon termination of the agree-
ment.110 Under Article VI of the Memorandum of Agreement, "the
storage or installation of nuclear or non-conventional weapons or
their components in Philippine territory shall be subject to the agree-
ment ,of the Government of the Philippines,""' since the Philippine
Constitution banned nuclear weapons on its bases." 2 Yet, the DOD,
pursuant to its policies, refused to disclose the existence of any nu-
clear weapons at the bases." 3
106. 1947 Military Bases Agreement, supra note 37, art. XVII, para. 2, at 4027.
107. 1988 Amendment, supra note 102, art. VII, para. 2, at 25. Paragraph 2 contin-
ues as follows: "There shall be no obligation on the part of the United States or of the
Philippines to rebuild or repair any destruction or damage inflicted from any cause
whatsoever on any of the non-removable buildings or structures used by the United
States in the bases." Id.
108.. Id.
109. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
110. 1988 Amendment, supra note 102, art. VII, para. 3, at 25. Paragraph 3 states
in full:
Upon final termination of the use by the Government of the United States
of the Facilities or earlier relinquishment, the United States and the Repub-
lic of the Philippines will take appropriate measures as they shall jointly de-
termine to ensure a smooth transition with respect to custody and control of
the Facilities and in order to minimize any disruptive effects of such
termination.
Id.
111. Id. art. VI, para. 1, at 25. The parties referred to. chemical and biological
weapons as "non-conventional weapons." Id. Agreed Minute, at 26 [hereinafter Min-
ute III.
112. See Malou Mangahas, Philippines: President Aquino Names Her Price for US
Military Bases, GUARDIAN, Feb. 18, 1991, at 12, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Phil File.
113. See Michael Bociurkiw, Philippines: Eruption Puts Defence Base Treaty Back
in Melting Pot, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 16, 1991, at 9, available in LEXIS,
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D. 1992 Proposed Treaty
In May 1990, pursuant to the 1966 Ramos-Rusk Exchange of Notes,
the Philippine government served the United States with a diplomatic
note terminating the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, effective Sep-
tember 16, 1991.114 Thereafter, the two nations engaged in the Philip-
pine-American Cooperation Talks ("PACT") for over a year,
producing an agreement extending the Subic Bay Naval Base lease for
another ten years, and providing for U.S. turnover of the smaller facil-
ities by September 16, 1991, and the heavily damaged Clark Air Force
Base by September 16, 1992.115 Importantly, the treaty also included
an explicit environmental protection provision requiring compliance
with Philippine laws of general applicability regarding hazardous and
toxic waste." 6 The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security,
which included supplementary agreements on Status of Forces and In-
stallations and Military Operating Procedures, was signed by both na-
tions on August 27, 1991, subject to ratification by the Philippine
Senate." 7
In the meantime, on September 16, 1991, the Philippine Foreign
Ministry rescinded the previous termination notice, leaving the 1947
Agreement in force until service of another termination notice, which
was required to be served one year in advance. 118 Subsequently, how-
ever, the Philippine Senate rejected the treaty, and the Philippines
served a new notice of termination in December 1991, requiring com-
plete withdrawal of the U.S. forces by the end of 1992.1" Although
the environmental provision in the proposed treaty never came into
effect, this Note asserts that the United States was nonetheless re-
Asiapc Library, Phil File (quoting statement by Stanley Schrager, spokesperson for
the U.S. Embassy in Manila, made in response to public concern of a possible nuclear
disaster after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo: "'[w]e neither confirm nor deny that we
have nuclear weapons but we can assure you that no nuclear weapons system is'in
danger." ") [hereinafter Bociurkiw III]; Subic Bay Cleanup Study Sought, supra note 7
(stating that the World Health Organization report "noted that the Navy [had] stead-
fastly refused to confirm or deny reports that it [had] stored chemical and nuclear
weapons in ammunition storage bunkers and open ammunition storage facilities.").
Later, it was reported that after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, 36 nuclear warheads
from cruise missiles at Clark were shipped aboard the cruiser U.S.S. Arkansas to an-
other U.S. base in Cebu, located in central Philippines, to be later shipped and un-
loaded in Guam. Paul Brown, Philippines: US Ships Nuclear Warheads Out of Base
Near Volcano, GUARDIAN, June 18, 1991, at 8, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Phil File. The missiles were reported to have been left behind at Clark. Id.
114. Quinn Statement, supra note 44. The Ramos-Rusk Exchange of Notes ad-
vanced the expiration of the termination of the agreement to 1991, unless terminated
by agreement at an earlier date. See Ramos-Rusk Exchange of Notes, supra note 39.
115. Quinn Statement, supra note 44; US-Philippine Joint Statement, supra note 41.
The proposed agreement also addressed issues involving economic, scientific, techno-
logical, cultural, educational, health and Filipino war veterans' concerns. Id.
116. See 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 30.
117. See US-Philippine Treaty, supra note 45.
•118. Quinn Statement, supra note 44.
119. See International Relations and Defence, supra note 53.
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quired to comply with environmental standards regarding activities at
the U.S. base facilities pursuant to DOD policies and RCRA.
III. THE DOD's RCRA AND FFCA OBLIGATIONS FOR
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
Notwithstanding the United States's contractual rights and obliga-
tions under the base agreements with the Philippines, the U.S. military
was bound, both by statute and its own policy, to comply with certain
environmental standards, particularly RCRA, at its installations.
120
While the judiciary has hesitated to find a clear waiver of federal sov-
ereign immunity in RCRA, Part III.B argues that it was clear that
Congress intended at the time of RCRA's enactment that its proce-
dural and substantive requirements apply to federal facilities.12' This
intent was reaffirmed when Congress enacted the FFCA.122 Part III.B
also cites an Executive Order directing executive agencies to ensure
compliance with RCRA at their facilities. 23
Part III.C then provides an analysis of the application of RCRA to
federal facilities, specifically military installations, located abroad.'24
While RCRA does not explicitly state that it applies overseas, DOD
policy regarding environmental compliance at overseas bases calls for
adherence to environmental laws of either the host country or the
United States. 25 In practice, the DOD has attempted to abide by this
policy, though not uniformly.'26 In fact, the DOD has been providing
annual reports to Congress in which it has declared its policy of adher-
ing to U.S. legal requirements at all bases-including those located
overseas.' 27 Moreover, the DOD annually requests funding from
Congress to meet environmental compliance requirements, including
those under RCRA, in its overseas operations. 28
A discussion of the application of U.S. law to overseas bases raises
the issue of extraterritoriality. Part III.D traces the history of the judi-
ciary's presumption that U.S. laws will not have extraterritorial appli-
cation unless the relevant statute clearly expresses congressional
120. See discussion infra parts III.B, III.C.
121. See discussion infra note 155 and text accompanying notes 160-64. The perti-
nent requirements under RCRA are set forth in part III.A.
122. See id.
123. See infra note 143.
124. See discussion infra part III.C.
125. See discussion infra part III.C.1. The GAO found activities that would consti-
tute violations of RCRA by the American military at overseas bases, but its report
was made under the presumption that RCRA did not apply to them. 1991 GAO
REPORT, supra note 58, at 2-4. The GAO reported, however, that hazardous waste
management plans for six of the bases studied call for using U.S. environmental laws
and implementing regulations as the primary guidance in carrying out the hazardous
waste management program at each base. Id. at 13.
126. See infra text accompanying note 168.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 186-88.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 194-205.
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intent of such application. 129 Part III.D then argues that because the
United States had considerable control and latitude over the bases
located in the Philippines, the bases were, in effect, "quasi-territories"
of the United States subject to U.S. laws. Thus, the concern of extra-
territorial application is inapplicable in this situation. Lastly, Part
III.E discusses the enforcement mechanisms and remedies available
under RCRA.
A. The Standards Set Forth by the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 130 was
enacted in 1976 as an amendment of the Solid Waste Disposal Act' 3 '
to implement federal control over hazardous waste management and
"encourage the conservation and recovery of valuable materials and
energy.' 32 The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984131
amended and modified RCRA "to assure adequate protection of pub-
lic health and the environment.' 1 34 The stated objectives of RCRA
are:
129. See discussion infra part III.D.
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
132. H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 (1984) reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5577. See also Wellington, supra note 6, at 9-10. Congress found
that "the problems of waste disposal.., necessitate Federal action through financial
and technical assistance and leadership in the development, demonstration, and appli-
cation of new and improved methods and processes to reduce the amount of waste
and unsalvageable materials and to provide for proper and economical solid waste
disposal practices." 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1988). Congress further found with re-
spect to the environment and health that:
(1) ... most solid waste is disposed of on land in open dumps and sanitary
landfills;
(2) disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste in or on the land without
careful planning and management can present a danger to human health and
the environment;
(3) ... inadequate and environmentally unsound practices for the disposal
or use of solid waste have created greater amounts of air and water pollution
and other problems for the environment and for health;
(4) open dumping is particularly harmful to health, contaminates drinking
water from underground and surface supplies, and pollutes the air and the
land;
(5) the placement of inadequate controls on hazardous waste manage-
ment will result in substantial risks to human health and the environment;
(7) . .. to avoid substantial risk to human health and the environment,
reliance on land disposal should be minimized or eliminated, and land dispo-
sal, particularly landfill and surface impoundment, should be the least fa-
vored method for managing hazardous wastes ....
Id. § 6901(b).
133. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
134. H.R. REP. No. 198, supra note 132, at 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5576.
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to promote the protection of health and the environment and to
conserve valuable material and energy resources by-
(3) prohibiting future open dumping on the land and requiring
the conversion of existing open dumps to facilities which do not
pose a danger to the environment...
(4) assuring that hazardous waste management practices are con-
ducted in. a manner which protects human health and the
environment;
(5) requiring that hazardous waste be properly managed in the
first instance thereby reducing the need for corrective action at a
future date .... 135
Congress thus declared the national policy of the United States:
"wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be re-
duced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible. Waste that is never-
theless generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to
minimize the present and future threat to human health and the
environment. 136
To meet its objectives, RCRA prohibits "the placement of bulk or
noncontainerized liquid hazardous waste or free liquids contained in
hazardous waste . . in any landfill.' 137 The statute further prohibits
the land disposal of:
* liquid hazardous wastes containing free cyanides at concentrations
greater than or equal to 1000 mg/l;
" liquid hazardous wastes containing certain concentrations of arse-
nic, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, nickel, selenium, or
thallium;
" liquid hazardous wastes having a pH less than or equal to two;
" liquid hazardous wastes containing a concentration of at least fifty
ppm of PCBs; and
" hazardous wastes containing halogenated organic compounds in to-
talled concentrations greater than or equal to 1000 mg/kg. 138
135. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1988).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)(1) (1988). RCRA defines "hazardous waste" to mean:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity,
concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an in-
crease in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of,
or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(2)(A)-(E). "Land disposal" is defined to include "any
placement of such hazardous waste in a landfill, surface impoundment, waste pile,
injection well, land treatment facility, salt dome formation, salt bed formation, or un-
derground mine or cave." Id. § 6924(k).
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RCRA also prohibits the land disposal of certain hazardous wastes
containing solvents or dioxins identified by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA").3 9 Storage of hazardous waste is permitted
only when such storage "is solely for the purpose of the accumulation
of such quantities of hazardous waste as are necessary to facilitate
proper recovery, treatment or disposal.""' Furthermore, RCRA re-
quires groundwater monitoring for surface impoundments, waste
piles, land treatment units, and landfills. 4 ' Clearly, then the practices
of the American military at the Philippine bases 42 fell under RCRA's
prohibitions.
B. The. Application of RCRA to Federal Facilities
In 1978, in response to the failure of federal agencies to comply with
environmental laws, President Jimmy Carter issued an Executive Or-
der 43 directing the head of each executive agency to ensure compli-
ance with pollution control standards, including RCRA, for federal
facilities and activities under the agency's control. Nevertheless, the
Order was for the most part ignored, and federal facilities continued
to pose the worst RCRA compliance problems.144 For instance, of the
348 federal facilities regulated. by the EPA, only forty-two percent
were in compliance with RCRA, with the noncomplying facilities fail-
ing either to disclose the release of hazardous wastes into the environ-
ment or conduct adequate groundwater monitoring.145  Federal
facilities proved to be among the worst violators of environmental
laws, with the DOD and the Department of Energy ("DOE") lead-
ing the pack by together producing twenty million tons of hazardous
or mixed hazardous wastes annually. 47 Estimates of cleanup costs for
139. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(j).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(p).
142. See discussion supra part I.C.
143. Exec. Order No. 12,088, § 1-102(f), 3 C.F.R. § 243 (1979), reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 note (1988). President Carter declared: "The head of
each Executive agency is responsible for ensuring that all necessary actions are taken
for the prevention, control, and abatement of environmental pollution with respect to
Federal facilities and activities under the control of the agency." Id. § 1-101.
144. H.R. REP. No. 111, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1287, 1288-89 (quoting President George Bush, Statement made in Se-
attle, Washington prior to his election (May 16, 1988): " 'Unfortunately, some of the
worst offenders are our own federal facilities. As President, I will insist that in the
future federal agencies meet or exceed environmental standards: The government
should live within the laws it imposes on others.' ").
145. Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 596 Before the Sub-
comm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1991) (statement of Christian R. Holmes, Assistant
Administrator for Federal Facilities Enforcement, Office of Enforcement, EPA).
146. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 144, at 7, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1293.
147. Andrea Gross, A Critique of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992, 12
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 691, 692 & n.15 (1993) (citing MOLLIE QUASEBARTH, CONGRES-
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DOD and DOE facilities reach $150 billion over the next thirty
years.14
8
Significantly, starting with Hancock v. Train, 49 courts have nar-
rowly construed waivers of sovereign immunity in environmental
laws,'5 ° thereby allowing federal facilities to disregard regulations. In
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held
that the sovereign immunity waiver contained in RCRA does not in-
clude punitive measures. 15  The Court thus determined that, since
Congress failed to unambiguously and unequivocally express a waiver
of federal sovereign immunity for past violations of RCRA, sovereign
immunity for punitive measures was not waived. 15  A minority view
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL LIABILITIES UNDER HAZARDOUS WASTE LAWS
xvi (1990)); 135 CONG. REC. 15,107 (1989) (statement of Rep. Eckart).
148. Id.
149. 426 U.S. 167, 180 (1976) (requiring "clear and unambiguous" waiver of sover-
eign immunity in the language of the Clean Air Act).
150. Id. See also EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426
U.S. 200, 214, 227 (1976) (finding no clear waiver in the Federal Water Pollution Act
Amendments of 1972 based upon analogy to a similar provision in the 1970 Clean Air
Act); United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1637, 1639 (1992) (find-
ing no waiver in the Clean Water Act because."sanction" in 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) re-
ferred only to coercive, and not punitive penalties and because the phrase "liable...
for ... civil penalties arising under federal law" was too ambiguous).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was adopted by American courts in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Based on English common law that "the
King can do no wrong," the doctrine protects the federal government from punish-
ment or injunction for noncompliance with state or federal law absent a waiver of
immunity. Gross, supra note 147, at 694; Gregory J. May, Casenote, United States
Department of Energy v. Ohio & the Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992: The
Supreme Court Forces a Hazardous Compromise in CWA and RCRA Enforcement
Against Federal Agencies, 4 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 363, 368 (1993).
151. DOE v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1640. Requirements that were held to be enforcea-
ble against the United States include licensing and reporting requirements. Id.; see
also Michael Donnelly & James G. Van Ness, The Warrior and the Druid-The DOD
and Environmental Law, 33 FED. B. NEWS & J. 37, 39 (1986) (stating that "[w]hile
[RCRA] § 6001 clearly subjects federal facilities to state and local" requirements, the
only enforceable sanction is injunctive relief since § 6001 makes no provision for ad-
ministrative fines or civil penalties).
Prior to the enactment of the FFCA, the failed waiver in RCRA stated:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the Federal Government... shall be subject to, and
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, both sub-
stantive and procedural (including any requirement for permits or reporting
or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be imposed
by a court to enforce such relief), respecting control and abatement of solid
waste or hazardous waste disposal in the same manner, and to the same ex-
tent, as any person is subject to such requirements ....
42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988) (amended by 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (Supp. V 1993)).
152. DOE v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1640. But see Maine v. Department of Navy, 702 F.
Supp. 322 (D. Me. 1988) (holding that RCRA clearly permitted civil penalties against
the federal government), vacated, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992) (vacating due to the
then recently decided Supreme Court decision in DOE v. Ohio). See generally May,
supra note 150 (discussing how federal facilities had been protected from compliance
with environmental regulations by sovereign immunity before the enactment of the
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finds this line of decisions harsh, contending that the construction of
the environmental statutes should be "fair," with the waiver of sover-
eign immunity broadly construed, as intended by Congress. 53 Indeed,
both President Carter's Executive Order and the congressional intent
regarding the applicability of RCRA on federal facilities show that
federal facilities were not exempt under RCRA.
Consequently, Congress enacted the Federal Facility Compliance
Act of 1992 ("FFCA")154 to explicitly state its intent to make RCRA
applicable to "all actions of the federal government, past and present,
which are subject to solid or hazardous waste laws.' 1 55 The FFCA, in
response to court decisions holding that the word "person" under
RCRA does not include the federal government, expressly added to
the definition "and shall include each department, agency, and instru-
FFCA). May argues that the Supreme Court, in finding no waiver under RCRA,
merely construed the provision strictly in favor of the sovereign without considering
any legislative history or intent behind RCRA. Id. at 372 & n.47 (comparing DOE v.
Ohio with Maine v. Department of Navy, noting that in the latter the district court
took into consideration the legislative history of RCRA).
153. May, supra note 150, at 368-69 & nn.31, 32 (citing United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1019-21 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Court's "love affair" with sovereign immunity has led to tragic results for litigating
citizens, the legislature, and the public at large); Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States
Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 521 (1984) (positing that the Court, in interpreting waivers
of sovereign immunity, should seek to effectuate congressional intent); Irwin v. De-
partment of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 90 (1990); United States v. Kubrick, 444
U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979) ("[W]e should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver
beyond that which Congress intended .... Neither, however, should we assume the
authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended.") (citations omitted); Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955); Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v.
United States, 324 U.S. 215, 222 (1945) (declaring that waivers should not be
"thwarted by an unduly restrictive interpretation"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overrid-
ing Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 409-10
(1991); Elizabeth K. Hocking, Survey, Federal Facility Violations of the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act and the Questionable Role of Sovereign Immunity, 5 AD.
MIN. L.J. 203, 229 (1991)) & 377-78 nn.81, 82 (citing DOE v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1642
(White, J., dissenting); Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520 (1991) ("[O]nce Congress
has waived sovereign immunity over certain subject matter, the Court should be care-
ful not to 'assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended.' ") (ci-
tations omitted); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983) (stating that
the waiver should be construed within the fair reading the statute requires)).
154. Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 note, 6903,
6908, 6924, 6927, 6939c, 6939c note, 6939d, 6939e, 6961, 6961 note, 6965 (Supp. V
1993)).
155. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 144, at 5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1291. The House Report stated:
The amendments to Section 6001 contained in this bill simply reaffirm in
more explicit language the original intent of Congress that federal facilities be
subject to all of the same substantive and procedural requirements, including
enforcement requirements and sanctions, such as civil penalties, that state
and local governments and private companies are subject to. The Commit-
tee intends for this legislation to overturn any court decisions which have
restricted in any fashion the waiver of sovereign immunity provided in Sec-
tion 6001.
Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1291-92 (emphasis added).
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mentality of the United States."'15 6 Importantly, the FFCA amended
the Solid Waste Disposal Act to provide:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government '(1)
having jurisdiction over any solid waste management facility or dis-
posal site, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may
result, in the disposal or management of solid waste or hazardous
waste shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, inter-
state, and local requirements, both substantive and procedural (in-.
cluding any requirement for permits or reporting or any provisions
for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be imposed by a
court to enforce such relief), respecting control and abatement of
solid waste or hazardous waste disposal and management in the
same manner, and to the same extent, as any person is subject to
such requirements, including the payment of reasonable service
charges. The Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and
procedural requirements referred to in this subsection include, but
are not limited to, all administrative orders and all civil and admin-
istrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether such penalties or
fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed for isolated,
intermittent, or continuing violations. The United States hereby ex-
pressly waives any immunity otherwise. applicable to the United
States with respect' to any such substantive or procedural require-
ment (including, but not limited to, any injunctive relief, adminis-
trative order'or civil or administrative penalty or fine referred to in
the preceding sentence, or reasonable service charge).' 57
Accordingly, the FFCA subjects non-compliant federal facilities to ad-
ministrative orders, civil penalties, and EPA fines.' 58 The FFCA was
signed into law by President George Bush and went into effect in Oc-
tober 1992.159
156. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (Supp. V 1993).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a). Compare this to the previous language of the sovereign
immunity waiver of RCRA, see supra note 151.
158. See Gross, supra note 147, at 699-701. Federal employees, however, are ex-
empt from any civil penalty,' but not from criminal sanction. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a).
Federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities are exempt from criminal sanc-
tion. Id.
Gross doubts that fines alone will increase federal facility compliance given the
current poor compliance rates by the facilities and considering other constraints such
as technological restraints, institutional barriers (meaning that agencies, especially the
DOD, may perceive environmental regulations as antithetical to their missions), diffi-
culties in obtaining appropriations to fund compliance, and the lack of monetary in-
centives to avoid fines. Gross, supra note 147, at 701-05.
159. See May, supra note 150, at 382. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 note. Arguably, since the
FFCA did not go into effect until October 1992, it did not apply to the U.S. military
bases overseas at, or prior to, that time. However, in enacting the FFCA, Congress
reaffirmed its original intent that RCRA apply to federal facilities. See infra text ac-
companying notes 161-64. Congress reiterated that federal facilities were not in-
tended to be exempt at the time of the original passage of RCRA. Thus, this author
contends that RCRA was meant to apply to U.S. bases at the time of U.S. occupation
of the bases, at least since the passage of RCRA.
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Congress clarified that the FFCA's waiver of sovereign immunity,
amending Section 6001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 16° merely ad-
ded to the already existing waiver of soyereign immunity under that
regulation. 6 ' As such, Congress intended RCRA to mandate compli-
ance by federal agencies.162 By enacting the FFCA, Congress reiter-
ated that RCRA and its waiver of sovereign immunity applied to the
federal government even before the enactment of the FFCA,163
thereby subjecting federal agencies to any type of civil penalty under
RCRA. 164
C. Application of RCRA to Overseas Federal Facilities
1. DOD Policy on Environmental Compliance at Overseas Bases
Officially, DOD overseas bases policy calls for strict adherence to
environmental laws of host countries and, to the extent practicable,
U.S. laws, whichever are more stringent, as well as with international
agreements and Status of Forces Agreements. 165 The DOD's general
policy also requires its components to comply "with the spirit as well
as the letter of federal environmental laws, executive orders, and reg-
ulations. ' ' 166 The DOD has revealed that it could not always abide by
the policy, claiming that if the host country had no existing, or less
stringent, environmental laws, application of U.S. laws to the overseas
base could pose political and diplomatic problems. 67
160. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
161. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 886, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 20-22 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1317, 1320-22.
162. See May, supra note 150, at 378 ("In light of Congress'[s] plausible intent to
expand the sovereign immunity waivers by amending the CWA and RCRA, the initial
inclusion of the United States could represent a strong indication of Congress'[s] de-
sire to subject the federal government to all civil penalties language in the entire
section.").
163. For a discussion of the problems of applying environmental laws to federal
facilities prior to the FFCA, see Donnelly & Van Ness, supra note 151. For a discus-
sion of how the FFCA is unlikely to improve compliance rates at federal facilities, see
Gross, supra note 145, at 701-05 (suggesting that federal agency non-compliance with
federal standards does not stem from sovereignty, but rather, from other restraints
such as technical, institutional and budgetary constraints).
164. See May, supra note 150, at 383-84 (stating, "[i]n effect, FFCA permits EPA,
states, and any citizen to sue the federal government for noncompliance with RCRA
requirements and to expect courts to impose punitive penalties").
165. See 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 58, at 12-13; Department of Defense Di-
rective No. 5100.50 (May 24, 1973, as amended), cited in William R. Shaw, The Proce-
dures to Ensure Compliance by Federal Facilities with Environmental Quality
Standards, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,211, 50,211 n.5 (Nov. 1975); Satchell,
supra note 13.
166. 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 58, at 13. Many argue that this policy only
applies to components located in the United States.
167. See id. at 12. The GAO disputes this claim, arguing that no political or diplo-
matic problems could possibly arise if the U.S. regulations are used only in places
where U.S. operations take place, and not where the military would be impinging on
the host country's sovereignty. Id. at 25-26.
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For the most part, DOD policy has not been followed, with each
branch of the armed services concluding that it is not compelled to
meet the requirements of U.S. laws and implementing regulations,
even when host country laws do not exist or are not as stringent as
U.S. laws."6 However, in a study of seven overseas bases from 1989
to 1990, the GAO found that the hazardous waste management plans
of six bases called for using U.S. environmental laws and implement-
ing regulations as the primary guidance in carrying out the program at
each base.'69 The Navy's Environmental and Natural Resources Pro-
gram Manual specifically states that "activities on overseas bases deal-
ing with hazardous materials handling and waste disposal should go
beyond host country environmental standards to ensure reasonable
protection to the environment'and human health.' 170
In the 1978 Executive Order previously discussed, President Jimmy
Carter declared that "each Executive agency that is responsible for
the construction or operation of Federal facilities outside the United
States shall ensure that such construction or operation complies with
the environmental pollution control standards of general applicability
in the host country or jurisdiction."17' Although the Order created no
right or benefit enforceable at law against the United States or its
agencies, 72 it established a standard overseas federal agency opera-
tions should follow. Philippine environmental laws are comprehen-
sive, and modeled on U.S. laws.173 Philippine air and water safety
laws were enacted in 1976, and hazardous waste regulations were en-
acted in 1990.171 The DOD's failure to comply with Philippine envi-
ronmental laws concerning pollution control amounted to a violation
of the Executive Order. Moreover, the DOD violated its own policy
by failing to adhere to the stricter of Philippine or U.S. environmental
standards.
168. See generally id. at 13-14, and discussion in this section, infra (regarding the
various interpretations of the policy at overseas bases, with bases violating the policy).
But see discussion infra part III.C.2 (discussing how the DOD and each of the services
have acknowledged that they are compelled to conform with U.S. laws and regula-
tions in their overseas activities, and actually have done so). Even if the DOD and
the services claim that they are only required to conform with host country environ-
mental laws, the 1991 GAO study found that hazardous waste management officials at
the bases visited were unfamiliar with host country laws. 1991 GAO REPORT, supra
note 58, at 15.
169. 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 58, at 13.
.170. Id. at 14.
171. Exec. Order No. 12,088, supra note 143, § 1-801.
172. Id. § 1-802.
173. See Albor I, supra note 55.
174. See it
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2. The DOD's Practice Regarding Compliance with Federal
Environmental Laws at Overseas Bases
In a 1986 Report to the Secretary of Defense, the GAO found that
the DOD was inadequately managing hazardous waste at domestic
bases, thereby posing harm to humans and the environment. 175 Sub-
sequently, the DOD Inspector General conducted two inspections of
hazardous waste management at overseas and domestic bases. The
Inspector General found that the DOD was not in compliance with
environmental laws and that the DOD's overall management of haz-
ardous materials and waste was unsatisfactory.1 76 The Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense agreed with most of the report and undertook
corrective action to implement the Inspector General's recommenda-
tions.1 77 The House Committee on Government Operations, Subcom-
mittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, thereafter
requested that the GAO evaluate the DOD's efforts to improve haz-
ardous waste management. 178
In response, the GAO investigated hazardous waste management at
seven bases in Pacific and European countries, encompassing nations
with strong and weak environmental programs, and produced a report
in 1991.179 The report originally submitted to the Secretary of De-
fense was classified, but the report released to Congress was an un-
classified version, with all references, names of installations, and
countries where they are located, deleted.'80 One news account, how-
ever, reported the locations of these bases to include Japan, Korea,
the Philippines, Germany, England and Italy.' 8 '
In essence, the 1991 Report concluded that the DOD had made
"limited progress in implementing [the] GAO's 1986 recommenda-
tions and in improving its management of hazardous waste overseas";
175. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-86-60, HAZARDOUS WASTE:
DOD's EFFORTS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF GENERATION, STORAGE, AND DIS-
POSAL 2 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 GAO REPORT].
176. See 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 58, at 16-17. The GAO report recounted
the DOD Inspector General's conclusions:
(1) DOD was not in compliance with environmental laws; (2) DOD's overall
management of hazardous materials and waste was unsatisfactory; (3) mini-
mization programs were fragmented and ineffective; (4) management of the
program to construct hazardous waste storage facilities was unsatisfactory;
(5) hazardous waste disposal contracting was inefficient, ineffective, and
costly; (6) the Hazardous Material Information System was antiquated, inef-
fective, and duplicative of other systems; and (7) training and education of
hazardous material handlers, supervisors, and commanders were inadequate.
Id.
177. Id. at 17.
178. Id. at 2.
179. Id. at 9-10.
180. Id. at 1 (cover letter from Nancy R. Kingsbury, Director, GAO Air Force Is-
sues, to Mike Synar, Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural
Resources, House Committee on Government Operations (Aug. 28, 1991)).
181. Satchell, supra note 13.
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the DOD had not given guidance to clarify applicability of U.S. laws
when host country hazardous waste laws either did not exist or were
not as stringent as U.S. laws; most of the overseas bases had inade-
quate hazardous waste management plans, which did not meet RCRA
requirements; hazardous Waste management training did not meet
DOD and RCRA requirements; and the DOD's oversight of activities
that generated hazardous waste "was still minimal."182 The GAO
182. 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 58, at 2-4. During its work at the Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Regional Office in Europe, the GAO learned of an in-
stance where a military base turned in a drum of hazardous waste that was mislabeled
"automotive grease." When Marketing Office personnel opened the drum, it was
learned that it contained a 5-gallon can of hydrochloric acid (a corrosive substance), a
1-gallon can of photo chemicals (a toxic material), 2.5 pounds of calcium hypochlorite
(an oxidizer), and automotive grease (an ignitable substance). "The combination of
the items was considered "extremely dangerous." Fortunately, when the drum was
opened and the pressure inside released, "only the workers' eyes and skin were irri-
tated." Id. at 23.
The GAO also found many storage problems. On one base, for instance, hazardous
waste was stored near drainage ditches, posing a risk that spills and leaks could enter
the ditches and flow into'a nearby river, which supplied the base with drinking water.
Id. at 30-31. At another base, the GAO found that an unmarked hazardous waste
storage area was located next to an open field that had no spill containment. Id. at 31.
At yet another base, items were stored in cardboard boxes, unprotected from rain,
and were spilled when storage containers toppled over in a storm. Id.
The GAO reported inspection by other entities that found, in one facility, that haz-
ardous waste was stored without adequate protection from fire or spillage, which
could cause a " 'major catastrophe.' " Id. at 32. Another inspection at the same base
found that the hazardous drum storage area was not covered, there was no spill con-
tainment, the pavement surface on which the waste was stored was inadequate to
prevent leaking into the ground, and that some chemicals were stored in deteriorating
containers. Id. There was a risk the conditions could contaminate a nearby farmer's
field and the groundwater. Id. Further, the GAO found soil or water contamination
at five of the seven bases, ranging from minor spills to possible contamination of
drinking water supplies. Id. at 33.
Overall, the GAO reported the following improper hazardous waste disposal at the
overseas bases visited:
" At two bases, runoff flowed from maintenance areas directly' into an off-base
watershed;
" At one base, rinseate from the electroplating shop was discharged directly into
nearby waters with no treatment;
" At the same base, chromate paint and other pollutants were discharged into a
drainage ditch;
" At the same base, waste freon, a halogenated solvent, was mixed with other petro-
leum wastes and sent to the power plant to be burned as fuel, causing emissions of
toxic fumes;
" At one base, dirt, used for absorbing oil spills, was buried;
" At the same base, an unauthorized dump site contained miscellaneous refuse in-
cluding oily water evidently from a burn pit;
* At the same base, rinseate from cleaning pesticide containers was dumped on the
ground;
" At two bases, improperly marked drums containing waste oil were left sitting on
ground that had turned dark from oil contamination;
" At three bases, hazardous waste was dumped in regular trash containers; and
" At three bases, absorbent material used to clean up hazardous waste spills was dis-
posed of with regular trash. Id. at 40.
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found that the DOD's attitude toward hazardous waste management
was not uniform at all bases. For instance, the DOD used many differ-
ent definitions for hazardous waste.183 Furthermore, the GAO con-
cluded that because the 1973 DOD guidance'84 on whether to follow
U.S. or host country environmental laws at overseas bases was unclear
and vague, each of the services and installations had its own varying
interpretation. 85
In its 1994 Annual Report to the President and Congress, the DOD
conceded that it is subject to the same environmental laws as private
industry, and any additional requirements imposed upon federal facili-
ties. 86 Regarding overseas facilities, the DOD declared that its goal
is "to achieve full and sustained compliance with all U.S. legal require-
ments. ''18 7 To achieve this end, the DOD annually obtains numerous
air emission permits, permits for water discharge from sewage, indus-
trial, and waste-water treatment plants, and storm water permits for
183. Id. at 10. For the purposes of the evaluation, the GAO defined hazardous
materials to mean "any expended material that is ignitable, corrosive; reactive, and/or
toxic[, including] used petroleum, oil, and lubricant products . . ., although RCRA
does, not include them in its definition, because the countries... visited considered
these items to be a special or regulated waste." Id.
184. See Department of Defense Directive No. 5100.50, supra note 165.
185. 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 58, at 12. For instance, at two bases the haz-
ardous waste management plans called for adherence to certain requirements of
RCRA (physical handling, labeling, and storage of hazardous wastes) but not to the
administrative requirements (obtaining a license and permit, and making reports to
the EPA). Id. at 13.
The DOD's failure to clarify its policy is a violation of Section 342 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, entitled "Reporting Requirements
on Environmental Compliance at Overseas Military Installations," which provides in
part:
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall develop a policy for determining appli-
cable environmental requirements for military installations located outside
the United States. In developing the policy, the Secretary shall ensure that
the policy gives consideration to adequately protecting the health and safety
of military and civilian personnel assigned to such installations.
(2) The Secretary of Defense shall develop a policy for determining the
responsibilities of the Department of Defense with respect to cleaning up
environmental contamination that may be present at military installations
located outside the United States. In developing the policy, the Secretary
shall take into account applicable international agreements (such as Status
of Forces agreements), multinational or joint use and operation of such in-
stallations, relative share of the collective defense burden, and negotiated
accommodations.
(3) The Secretary of Defense shall develop a policy and strategy to ensure
adequate oversight of compliance with applicable environmental require-
ments and responsibilities of the Department of Defense determined under
the policies developed under paragraphs (1) and (2). In developing the pol-
icy, the Secretary shall consider using the Inspector General of the Depart-
ment of Defense to ensure active and forceful oversight.
10 U.S.C. § 2701 note.
186. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
85 (1994) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
187. Id.
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every base. According to the DOD's report to the President and Con-
gress, the DOD also annually manages permits to treat, store, and dis-
pose of hazardous waste under RCRA, manages numerous regulated
underground storage tanks, and prepares spill prevention and re-
sponse plans at every base.'88
The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure Re-
alignment Act189 provides that in closing a military installation, the
Secretary of Defense,
subject to the availability of funds authorized for and appropriated
to the Department of Defense for environmental restoration and
the availability of funds in the [Department of Defense Base Clo-
sure] Account, may carry out activities for the purpose of environ-
mental restoration, including reducing, removing, and recycling
hazardous wastes and removing unsafe buildings and debris.' 90
In the 1994 Annual Report, the DOD claimed that it has been clean-
ing up approximately 1800 military installations and more than 8000
formerly used sites.' 91 To conduct this remedial action, the DOD uses
funding from the Defense Environmental Restoration Account
("DERA") created by Congress in 1984.192 Further, the DOD estab-
lished an office of International Activities under the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security ("DUSD(ES)"),
which developed a policy of consultation and burdensharing with host
nations for the return of bases. 193 Unfortunately, the office was not
set up until after the closing of the bases in the Philippines, and there-
fore the consultation and burdensharing policy is inapplicable to the
U.S. pullout from the Philippines.
In addition, the DOD submitted a report to Congress entitled, the
"Report on Environmental Compliance," to itemize its environmental
compliance funding requirements, including those for overseas opera-
tions, for fiscal years 1994 to 1999.194 The DOD claimed in the report
that it employed more than 7200 military and civilian personnel "to
188. Id.
189. Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 154 note, 1095a, 2306 note, 2324, 2324 notes, 2683, 2687 notes, 4415).
190. Id. § 204(a)(3), 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (1988). The Act defines "military instal-
lation" as "a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or
other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department." Id.
§ 209(6), 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note. The Act did not distinguish between those military
installations located in the United States and those overseas. Arguably, the provision
applies to military installations abroad.
191. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 186, at 83.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 88.
194. DEP'T OF DEFENSE REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE 1-1 (1993).
The Report was submitted pursuant to section 2706(b) of Title 10 of the United States
Code, which requires the DOD to submit an annual report containing, inter alia, a
statement of the funding levels and full-time personnel required by the DOD and
each military installation to comply with applicable environmental laws during the
fiscal year, and an analysis of the effect that compliance with such environmental laws
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ensure that environmental concerns are properly carried out at instal-
lations worldwide."'1 95
For example, the Army, which contends that it practices "environ-
mental stewardship abroad as well as in the U.S.,"'196 reported that, for
fiscal year 1994, it expected to require 150 personnel, and approxi-
mately $106.6 million in funding, for environmental compliance in ma-
jor commands outside the United States.197 The Army reported that
more than half of the Notices of Violations it received were violations
of RCRA, 98 and that many of the findings by its Environmental
Compliance Assessment System occurred under the hazardous waste
disposal and hazardous materials management provisions of
RCRA.199
Similarly, the Department of the Navy purportedly "accepts the en-
vironmental responsibilities that accompany its global operations on
land, at sea, and in the air." 2" The Navy estimated that in fiscal year
1994, it would need approximately $14.9 million and 89 personnel, and
the Marine Corps would need approximately $5.4 million and 4 per-
sonnel, for environmental compliance for major commands outside
the United States.20 1 The Navy pointed out that "impending issues
such as environmental compliance and clean up at overseas installa-
tions, will further challenge the Navy to more effectively plan and
manage scarce resources to comply with legal requirements while pre-
serving mission capability.""2 2 Thus, the Navy clearly acknowledges
compliance with environmental regulations for its overseas
operations.
Likewise, the Air Force claims that it is compelled to obey environ-
mental laws, proclaiming that "environmental compliance is an issue
of paramount importance."20 3 For fiscal year 1994, the Air Force esti-
mated funding of $38.8 million and 60 personnel for environmental
compliance at installations outside the United States.2°, The Air
Force recognizes that compliance with legal regulations and the fed-
eral government's policy to protect and enhance the environment may
constrain or prohibit Air Force operations and missions, which are its
top priority. However, the Air Force believes that its mission "is not
may have on the operations and mission capabilities of the DOD and of each military
installation. 10 U.S.C. § 2706(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
195. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 2-1.
197. Id. tbls. 2-1, -3, at 2-2, -8.
198. Id. at 2-13.
199. Id. at 2-14.
200. Id. at 3-1.
201. Id. tbls. 3-1, -4, at 3-2, -3, -13.
202. Id. at 3-20. For a more detailed discussion of the Department of the Navy's
policy regarding environmental protection, land use, and resource conservation, see
Wellington, supra note 6, at 29-33.
203. REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 194, at 4-1.
204. Id. tbls. 4-3, -4, at 4-9, -10.
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mutually exclusive from [sic] achieving and maintaining a commit-
ment to environmental quality."20 5
The military's reported funding requirements, both past and future,
further support the assertion that the DOD had RCRA obligations at
its bases in the Philippines. By their own practice, the DOD and its
branches have been using funds to meet federal requirements in at
least some of the overseas installations. In fact, the DOD and its
branches have acknowledged that they are statutorily compelled to
obey U.S. environmental laws, including RCRA, regarding their over-
seas operations. As the DOD has complied with RCRA requirements
at some of the overseas bases, it should have complied with RCRA
requirements at bases located in the Philippines.
D. Application of RCRA to Overseas Facilities:
Is It Extraterritorial?
Traditionally, there has been a presumption against the extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. laws.2°6 This presumption is rooted in the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction principle of international law,20 7 and was first
followed by the Supreme Court in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co.,2°8 which held that the acts of the defendant in Panama and
Costa Rica were not within the scope of the Sherman Act. In that
case, Justice Holmes declared that: "the general and almost universal
rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be deter-
mined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done. '20 9 The
Court also determined that "'[a]ll legislation is prima facie
territorial.' "210
However, in The Over the Top,21 the district court declared that
"unless it unmistakably appears that a congressional act was intended
to be in disregard of a principle of international comity, the presump-
tion is that it was intended to be in conformity with it."'212 In other
words, even though statutes are presumed to conform with interna-
tional comity, Congress can violate international law if it so intends.
The Over the Top thus established the test for applying U.S. laws to
205. Id. at 4-18.
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 38 (1965) ("Rules of United States statutory law, whether prescribed by
federal or state authority, apply only to conduct occurring within, or having effect
within, the territory of the United States . . . ."). See also R. David Kitchen, Case
Comment, NEPA's Overseas Myopia: Real or Imagined?, 71 GEO. L.J. 1201, 1214-23
(1983) (discussing cases following the presumption, to explain how NEPA has been
held not to apply extraterritorially).
207. See generally J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 201-03
(10th ed. 1989).
208, 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
209. Id. at 356.
210. Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
211. 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925).
212. Id. at 842.
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conduct outside the United States: whether congressional intent to
disregard international law and to have the statute have extraterrito-
rial application is clearly expressed in the language of the statute.213
However, in the 1930s, courts established an exception to this rule
for antitrust laws, which do not clearly express congressional intent of
extraterritorial application.214 The courts declined to use the congres-
sional intent test, but rather used the "effects" test, which inquires
whether the relevant conduct has consequences within the U.S.
territory.215Yet, for "non-market" statutes, such as labor and environmental
laws, where congressional intent is often unclear, courts have declined
to use the liberal effects test and have continued instead to use the
rigid intent test.21 6 These courts have treated the presumption as a
rule, requiring clear expression of congressional intent of extraterrito-
rial application in the language of the statutes, 217 rather than The Over
the Top theory that congressional acts are presumed to comply with
international law, unless the language of the statute clearly expresses
otherwise.218 Even where congressional intent is clear in such laws,
the courts have required another test, thereby reverting to the "effects
and conduct" test, which inquires whether: (1) the conduct occurred
213. Id. at 843.
214. See Jonathan Turley, Legal Theory: "When in Rome": Multinational Miscon-
duct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 604-05
(1990).
215. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)
(Judge Hand declaring: "it is settled law... that any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders which the state reprehends"). In Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977), remanded, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (applying the Ninth Circuit's tripartite analysis), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032'(1985), the Ninth Circuit used a tripartite analysis to
determine whether the Sherman Act should have extraterritorial application to the
facts of that case:
[1] Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign
commerce of the United States?
[2] Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of
the Sherman Act?
[3] As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover it?
Id. at 615.
216. E.g., Boureslan V. Aramco, 892 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1990) (Title VII
claim), aff'd sub nom. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Aramco, 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1949) (Eight Hour
Law claim). See also Turley, supra note 214, at 601, 627.
217. Accord Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1957)
(requiring "the affirmative intention of the Congress [be] clearly expressed" to apply
statute extraterritorially); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regu-
latory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (requiring an "unequivocal man-
date from Congress" to extraterritorially apply the provision in NEPA that required
federal agencies to submit an environmental impact statement prior to any federal
actions).
218. 5 F.2d at 842-43. See also Tirley, supra note 214, at 602.
1994].
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within or outside the territory of the United States, (2) had any ef-
fects, or was intended to have any effects, within the United States, or
(3) involved any conduct of nationals of the United States. 219 The
courts have thus bifurcated the test in determining the extraterritorial
application, requiring first as a threshold issue a clear mandate of
Congress, and, if such a mandate is found, inquiring into the effects
and conduct test.
Recently, in Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,220 the Southern Dis-
trict of New York declined to apply the effects and conduct test be-
cause it construed RCRA to have a "domestic focus," and therefore
found that the language of RCRA failed to express a clear intent by
Congress for the citizen suit and venue provisions to have extraterrito-
rial application.22' In Amlon, plaintiff Amlon, a U.S. corporation, ac-
quired metal residues and shipped them via FMC, another U.S.
corporation, to Leeds, England, to be sent to Wath, a U.K. corpora-
tion, for drying and other processing. On June 9, 1989, twenty con-
tainers of Amlon's metals were delivered to Leeds, England, thirteen
of which were shipped to Wath's premises, whereupon Wath's person-
nel detected a strong odor emanating from the containers. 222
Thereafter, FMC informed Amlon that the odor was probably due
to xylene, which FMC stated was in concentrations of 0 to 100 parts
per million.223 Because xylene was listed as a hazardous substance by
the EPA, Amlon rejected the seven containers still left at Leeds.
Wath then notified the British government. Wath's own test of the
material revealed concentrations of xylene up to ten times higher than
FMC had claimed, as well as "7-hydrogen (an Allegedly carcinogenic
pesticide intermediary) and chlorinated phenols (which may form di-
oxin when exposed to heat and a catalyst). ' 224 The Health and Safety
Executive of the United Kingdom then required Wath to enclose the
material in drums.225 The plaintiffs then brought suit against FMC,
seeking injunctive relief and damages for, among other things, defend-
ant's violation of RCRA, on the grounds that the materials may pres-
ent an imminent and substantial danger to human health and the
environment.226
The Amlon court admitted that the extraterritorial application of
RCRA was a case of first impression.227 As a threshold question, the
court inquired whether Congress intended RCRA to have extraterri-
219. See Turley, supra note 214, at 630-31 (citing the test used in NRDC v. NRC,
647 F.2d at 1357).
220. 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
221. Id. at 673, 674-75.
222. Id. at 669-70.
223. Id. at 669.
224. Id. at 670.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 670, 672.
227. Id. at 670.
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torial application.22 Having found no such intent, the court saw no
reason to reach the effects and conduct test.229 Taking into considera-
tion RCRA's language and legislative history, the court held that
RCRA's concern is domestic in nature, and therefore no clear intent
of extraterritorial application was expressed.230
Undoubtedly, Amlon is distinguishable from the overseas military
bases because Amlon did not involve a federal agency or the FFCA,
which was enacted after the Amlon decision. The FFCA clearly man-
dated federal agency compliance with RCRA,23' and, in fact, was en-
acted by Congress specifically to combat judicial decisions holding
that federal agencies were immunized from RCRA.232 In particular,
Congress enacted the FFCA because federal agencies, specifically the
DOE and the DOD, were among the worst violators of RCRA.233
Congress intended to address such violations under the FFCA. The
FFCA also reiterated that RCRA, as originally enacted, was clearly
intended to apply to federal facilities. 234 Therefore, under the thresh-
old congressional intent test, RCRA, and as amended by the FFCA,
was intended to apply to all activities by, and facilities of, the DOD-
arguably including those overseas. Even the DOD itself recognizes
and practices compliance with U.S. environmental laws in its overseas
operations, since it annually submits to Congress its funding require-
ments for environmental compliance in overseas operations.23 5
Notwithstanding, the application of RCRA, as amended by the
FFCA, to overseas military bases is in effect not extraterritorial.
Rather, it is an application of U.S. laws to facilities, activities and op-
erations that are under U.S. control. According to the U.S.-Philippine
military base agreements, although the Philippines had sovereignty
over the bases, the United States had control and command over the
U.S. facilities and forces on the bases.236 It was the activities of the
U.S. forces at the U.S. facilities in the Philippines over the years that
violated RCRA,237 and consequently caused the environmental dam-
age to the air, water, and land in and surrounding the bases in the
Philippines. This particular situation, when scrutinized under the ef-
fects and conduct test, would satisfy the test for applying RCRA to
228. Id. at 673.
229. Id. at 676.
230. Id. at 674-76.
231. See discussion supra part III.B.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See infra note 155.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 194-205.
236. See discussion supra part II.
237. Cf 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 58, at 27-28 (finding that the hazardous
waste management at the seven bases visited, allegedly including Subic Bay, would
have been violations of RCRA and its implementing regulations, and that the hazard-
ous waste management plans of all seven bases did not encompass all RCRA
requirements).
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the U.S. bases in the Philippines, because the conduct involved U.S.
nationals, and affected facilities under U.S. control.238 Therefore, the
situation would satisfy the two-part test for extraterritorial applica-
tion, even though, in effect, the application of RCRA to overseas ba-
ses, particularly in the case of the Philippines, is a territorial issue.
E. Enforcement
The Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by RCRA and the
FFCA, can be enforced several ways, but a more viable remedy in.the
case of the former U.S. military bases in the Philippines is to,impose a
civil penalty on the DOD.239 Section 6928(a)(1) of Title 42 of the
United States Code, "Compliance orders," authorizes the Administra-
tor of the EPA to either "issue an order assessing a civil penalty for
any past or current violation, requir[e] compliance immediately or
within a specified time period, or both. ''24  In this situation, compli-
ance is a moot issue, and as such an order would be ineffectual.
238. See supra text accompanying note 219 (discussion of the effects andconduct
test).
239. One enforcement mechanism enables the Administrator of the EPA, upon a
finding of a violation of the requirements of the Act by a person, to either issue a
compliance order or an order assessing a civil penalty for any past or current viola-
tions or both. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (1988). The FFCA explicitly reaffirmed that a
"person" for the purposes of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, includes "each depart-
ment, agency, and instrumentality of the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (Supp.
V 1993).
Under RCRA, the Administrator can also seek a temporary or permanent injunc-
tion, or other appropriate relief, from a U.S. district court in the district in which the
violation occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1). The law also provides: "[n]either the
Unitd States, nor any agent, employee, or officer thereof, shall be immune or exempt
from any process or sanction of any State or Federal Court. with respect to the en-
forcement of any such injunctive relief." 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
However, since the subject violation occurred outside the United States, it is ques-
tionable whether federal courts can exercise jurisdiction over such a suit.
For this same reason, it is doubtful that a citizen suit is applicable to the topic of this
Note. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) allows any person to commence a civil action
against any person, including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency,... and including any past or present generator,
past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treat-
ment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing
to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dispo-
sal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988) (emphasis added). "Any action under paragraph
(a)(1) of this subsection shall be brought in the district court for the district in which
the alleged violation occurred or the alleged endangerment may occur." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a) (1988) (emphasis added):
Furthermore, the courts have held that this citizen suit provision only allows pro-
spective relief. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,
484 U.S. 49, 57 & n.2 (1987). In the case of the Philippines military bases, the viola-
tions occurred in the past, and are not continuing. Therefore, a citizen would not
have standing to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
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On the other hand, civil penalties could serve as reimbursement for
cleanup costs. According to the statute, the maximum penalty is
$25,000 per day of noncompliance for each violation of a RCRA re-
quirement.241 Since the violation at the bases occurred over an ex-
tended period of time, this penalty could add up to a prodigious
amount. One should be cognizant, however, that in assessing the pen-
alty, the Administrator can take into account the seriousness of the
violation and the DOD's good faith efforts to comply with applicable
requirements.242
Nonetheless, the United States might still face arlarge penalty under
this standard. First, the violation is serious because the 1992 GAO
Report on the military base closures in the Philippines indicated that
there had been "significant environmental damage to [the] facilities in
the Philippines" that would be in violation, of federal standards.243
Second, concerning the good faith effort to comply, the GAO Report
indicated that Navy and Air Force environmental officials had previ-
ously identified these violations,2 " and officials had proposed projects
to bring the facilities into compliance with the regulations.245 Yet, the
projects were left unfunded, 246 and the United States failed to imple-
ment projects to enable compliance with the regulations. Further-
more, the GAO first made a report to the Secretary of Defense in
1986, identifying problems with hazardous waste management at mili-
tary facilities. 247 Further reviews, specifically including the bases in
the Philippines, were submittedby the GAO in 1991 and 1992.21 Ac-
cordingly, under this analysis, the Administrator might likely find that
a large penalty would be appropriate.
However, some have argued that the section of RCRA, as amended
by the FFCA, which authorizes the EPA to issue administrative orders
and fine a noncomplying federal. agency, may be constitutionally sus-
pect.249 The Department of Justice asserts that the EPA, itself an ex-
ecutive agency, cannot sue the DOD because an intrabranch dispute
raises the question of whether the parties are adverse.250 Article III of
241..42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (1988).
242. Id.
243. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 3, 27.
244. Id. at 27.
245. Id. at 28.
246. Id.
247. 1986 GAO REPORT, supra note 175.
248. 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 58; 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6.
249. See generally Bettigole, supra note 69, at 701-04, 706; May, supra note 150, at
370 n.36 (stating that the Justice Department prohibits the EPA from suing federal
agencies because of the "unitary executive" theory).
250. Bettigole, supra note 69, at 701-03; Environmental Compliance by Federal
Agencies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-11 (1987) (state-
ment of F. Henry Habict II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources
Division, Department of Justice); Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal
Agencies?, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317, 325 (1990).
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the United States Constitution requires that a suit be a "case or con-
troversy" to be justiciable.251 The constitutionality of this RCRA sec-
tion, however, has yet to be challenged. Also, the EPA need not sue
the federal agencies; administrative orders or penalties are enforced in
judicial proceedings.25 2
Another possibility is criminal penalties. To impose criminal penal-
ties, RCRA requires that the "person," in this instance the agency,
violating the requirements of the statute knew that either it placed
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm,
or it was acting in violation of the license requirements of the stat-
ute.253 As discussed above, the damage caused by practices at the ba-
ses are serious, including a high likelihood of groundwater
contamination.254 Further, in a country where rain and monsoons are
common, leakage and burial of hazardous materials pose a great dan-
ger of serious bodily harm.
Other than remedies under RCRA, claims may also be brought
against the United States under host country laws.255 The 1991 GAO
Report indicated that, as of October 1990, the Claims Center, which
handles claims against U.S. forces, had received 1259 claims totaling
$25.8 million for damage caused by the military's poor environmental
practices. Eighteen of these claims, totaling $21.8 million, arose as a
result of the military's improper handling, storage, or disposal of haz-
ardous waste.25 6 The DOD accepted responsibility for certain claims,
and has reimbursed some of the claimants a total of approximately
$50,000,25 a small sum considering the nature and extent of the dam-
age done.
In light of the past auspicious relations with the Philippines, and
considering the Philippines's lower bargaining power in negotiating
the military base agreements, it is both fair and reasonable to utilize
these penalties to compensate for the damage done by the DOD to
the environment in and around the Philippine bases, or at least,
to assist in the cleanup effort. At a minimum, the imposition of civil
penalties on the United States might encourage other nations, in ne-
gotiating agreements with the DOD, to include better-defined envi-
251. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
252. See Wellington, supra note 6, at 27, tbl. 7 n.9.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) & (e).
254. See discussion supra part I.C. See also Bettigole, supra note 69, at 689-91.
Bettigole states, "the military's harm has been visibly evident, immediate, and
profound," and argues that, "just as the court in People v. Gray suggested that New
York's failure to comply with EPA air pollution standards created an imminent harm,
the military's failure to comply with hazardous waste laws also suggests that an immi-
nent harm has occurred." Id. at 690 (citing People v. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851, 856 n.2
(Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1991)).
255. 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 58, at 4, 46. This author does not know if




ronmental standards and compliance obligations. Perhaps more
importantly, the imposition of fines might encourage the U.S. military
to change its practices at overseas bases to ensure proper compliance
with applicable environmental laws.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW
An analysis of international law reveals that a number of well-set-
tled principles are pertinent to the operation of U.S. military bases in
the Philippines. Perhaps the best known of these principles is the ter-
ritoriality and sovereignty theory embodied in Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration, which provides that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.258
Just as requiring military bases to follow U.S. law does not violate
extraterritorial principles of U.S. case law, mandating that the DOD
comply with U.S. environmental regulations is consistent with Princi-
ple 21. Such a mandate would respect Philippine sovereignty over
their own lands, and would impose upon the United States the respon-
sibility to ensure that the activities within the U.S.-controlled facilities
do not damage the Philippine environment.
In addition, Principle 6 of the Stockholm Declaration states that:
"the discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and the re-
lease of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the
capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must be halted
in order to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted
upon ecosystems. '' 259 As revealed by several reports previously dis-
cussed,26 activities by the DOD at the Philippine bases undoubtedly
violated Principle 6.
Further, Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration, which stresses
the necessity for comprehensive liability and victim compensation
schemes, undeniably applies to the U.S.-Philippine military base situa-
tion. Principle 22 expressly declares that: "[s]tates shall cooperate to
develop further the international law regarding liability and compen-
258. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Princi-
ple 21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf 48/14 and Corr. 1 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declara-
tion] (emphasis added). See also Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Principle 2, at 9 in U.N. DEP'T
OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, AGENDA 21: THE UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME OF Ac-
TION FROM Rio, U.N. Doc. DPI/1344, U.N. Sales No. E.93.1.11 (1993) (restating Prin-
ciple 21 of the Stockholm Declaration).
259. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 258, at Principle 6.
260. See discussion supra part I.C.
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sation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage
caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such states to
areas beyond their jurisdiction. "261 Therefore, this principle encour-
ages the development in international law of compensation to victims
for the precise type of violations committed by the DOD at the bases
in the Philippines.
Similarly, requiring DOD compliance with U.S. environmental laws
in their overseas operations is consistent with international law as set
forth in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.262 Section 402 of
the Restatement states:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with re-
spect to
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place
within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present
within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals
outside as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its na-
tionals that is directed against the security of~the state or against a
limited class of other state interests.263
Thus, pursuant to section 402, the United States may prescribe 'laws
with respect to activities of U.S. forces outside the United States, such
as on overseas military bases.
Section 403 of the Restatement provides, in pertifient part:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402
is present,'a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another state
when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity
is unreasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, in-
cluding, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulat-
ing state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes
place within the territory, or has substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or eco-
nomic activity, between the regulating state and the
person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated ...
261. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 258, at Principle 22 (emphasis added).
262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIrED STATES
(1987).
263. Id. § 402 (emphasis added).
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(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the im-
portance of regulation to the regulating state, the ex-
tent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desirability of such regulation
is generally accepted;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest
in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another
state.2 64
In view of these factors, it is reasonable for the United States to pre-
scribe law with respect to activities at U.S. bases located in the Philip-
pines because there were strong ties between the two nations,265 both
nations regulate such activities in their own jurisdictions (indicating
also that the Philippines has a strong interest in regulating the activ-
ity), 26 6 and because there was no conflict between U.S. and Philippine
regulations, as Philippine environmental laws mirror U.S. laws.267
In short, an application of RCRA to overseas U.S. installations is
consistent with international law. One must acknowledge that such an
application respects Philippine sovereignty because: (1) the military
facilities that created the violations were under U.S. control, and
therefore, under U.S. jurisdiction; (2) the Philippines had an interest
in regulating the very kind of activities that caused the environmental
damage, as evidenced by the fact that the Philippines has laws in place
regulating such activities; (3) it is desirable for all host country nations
that the activities be regulated; (4) it is equally desirable for the
United States that its overseas forces abide by U.S. environmental
laws to preserve good political and diplomatic relations with host
countries; and (5) the U.S. laws to be applied mirror Philippine envi-
ronmental law, and, as such, are not incompatible with Philippine
laws.
CONCLUSION
The cleanup of the environmental damage caused by the United
States during its occupation and control of U.S. bases in the Philip-
pines will cost millions of dollars, a substantial expense which the Phil-
ippines cannot afford. Although the last military base agreement in
force offered no well-defined environmental responsibility for the
United States,268 the agreements clearly granted the United States the
use and control over U.S. facilities at the bases during American occu-
264. Id. § 403.
265. See discussion supra parts L.A & I.B (tracing the history and auspicious rela-
tions between the Philippines and the United States).
266. See discussion supra parts III.A & ILI.B and text accompanying notes 173-74.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
268. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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pation.269 The United States enjoyed this benefit for forty-five years.
The aid given to the Philippines was independent of this right and
benefit; the aid was thus not compensation or "rent" for the use of the
bases. With the United States's benefit from the use of the bases must
come liability, or at the very least, the obligation to maintain the bases
in safe condition so that they were toxic-free when they were returned
to the Philippines. In fact, Article VIII of the 1947 Agreement gave
the United States the right to take necessary steps "to improve health
and sanitation in areas contiguous to the bases" and offered compen-
sation from the United States for any damage resulting from such
steps taken. 270 The agreement thus contemplated that the United
States would take health and safety measures.
Furthermore, the agreement only exonerated the United States
from obligations for damage to non-removable buildings and struc-
tures, and from returning the bases in the condition they were in at
the time of U.S. occupation. 271 The United States had been creating
hazardous waste problems and contamination over the years during its
occupation 272 -it would hardly be desirable for the United States to
return the bases in such condition. However, the agreement did not
exonerate the United States from returning the bases in their original
untainted condition, or at least, in a safe and toxic-free condition.273
Moreover, DOD overseas policy and President Carter's Executive
Order required compliance by overseas federal facilities with, at least,
host nation environmental laws.274 Since 1976, the Philippines had in
place environmental laws modeled after U.S. laws.275 By failing to
comply with those laws, the DOD violated its own policy and the Ex-
ecutive Order. Unfortunately, the DOD policy and the Executive Or-
der do not create a cause of action against the United States for any
violations.276 Also, although the base agreement allows for civil liabil-
ity claims under Article XXIII, such claims must have been made
within one year of the occurrence or 'incident from which the claim
arose. 277 It would be too late to bring a claim under this article now
because the United States left the Philippine bases over a year ago.
While compensation from the United States is available under Article
VIII, it is limited to private claims arising out of measures taken by
the United States to ensure health and safety.278
269. See discussion supra part II.
270. 1947 Military Bases Agreement, supra note 37, art. VIII, at 4023.
271. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
272. See generally 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 6.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 105-09.
274. See discussion supra part III.C.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
276. See supra note 172.
277. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
278. See supra text accompanying note 91.
OVERSEAS BASE CONTAMINATION
In its Annual Report of Environmental Compliance submitted to
the President and Congress, the DOD admitted that no uniform pol-
icy concerning environmental restoration at operating overseas bases
had been set.279 Notwithstanding, the DOD also conceded that it is
"responsible for environmental contamination resulting from decades
of operations both in the United States and overseas. ' 2 ° The DOD
added that it is "committed to cleaning up environmental damage re-
sulting from past practices ... [and] managing responsibly the natural
and cultural resources it holds in public trust."'281 This policy should
thus be applied to the environmental damage caused by past U.S.
practices at its bases in the Philippines. Furthermore, in creating this
damage, the United States violated RCRA, as amended by the FFCA,
which, as discussed above, applies, or should apply, to overseas mili-
tary bases. In enacting RCRA, the congressional intent was to apply
RCRA to the DOD in light of the reports of violations at military
installations. Furthermore, even the Department of Defense recog-
nized its obligations to comply with RCRA regarding its overseas
activities.
Finally, mandating compliance by the DOD with U.S. environmen-
tal laws at their overseas bases is consistent with U.S. extraterritorial
principles and international law because compliance respects sover-
eignty of the Philippines and protects both countries' interests in regu-
lating such activities. In light of the long and propitious relations
shared by the Philippines and the United States through politics, di-
plomacy, security, and economics, it is incumbent upon the United
States to accept responsibility for the environmental damage it caused
during its occupation of the bases in the Philippines.
279. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 186, at 89.
280. Id. at 83.
281. Id. at 90.
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